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THOUGHTS REGARDING THE APPLICATION OF
THE STEP TRANSACTION DOCTRINE TO THE
SECTION 351 CONTROL REQUIREMENT AND
COMPLEX MEDIA, INC. V. COMMISSIONER
PHILIP G. COHEN*
ABSTRACT
Over thirty years ago, Professor Ronald H. Jensen authored
an article in the Virginia Tax Review, titled “Of Form and Substance: Tax Free Incorporations and Other Transactions Under
Section 351.” Professor Jensen asserted that it was inappropriate
to utilize the step transaction doctrine to determine whether the control requirement was met in a purported section 351 transaction,
involving a disposition of some, or all, of the transferor’s shares even
if effected by a binding contract made prior to the contribution.
Professor Jensen concluded that the courts and the Internal
Revenue Service (Service) have produced a hodgepodge of intellectually inconsistent decisions and rulings making predictability
problematic. There is no doubt of the many inconsistencies rendered by the Service and the courts in addressing the use of the step
transaction to determine whether the control test under section 351
has been satisfied when there had been dispositions connected with
the initial contribution. Nevertheless, there are sound policy reasons for the application of this judicial canon in certain circumstances and that Professor Jensen’s prescription for remedying the
problem, i.e., by the complete elimination of the doctrine’s utilization in this context, is unwarranted.
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their assistance with this Article. All errors, omissions, and views, however,
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This Article also considers the recent Tax Court decision,
Complex Media, Inc. v. Commissioner, which addresses a different
facet of section 351 control. The case involved, inter alia, the taxpayer’s successful attempt to invoke the step transaction doctrine to
treat as boot, payments made to one of the partners of the transferor. Another aspect of the arrangement, however, is particularly
troubling and the reason why discussion of the case is part of this
Article examining section 351 control. This concerns the taxpayer’s
position regarding how the requisite ownership was achieved. The
court, at the behest of both parties, reluctantly agreed to include an
act, i.e., a merger, in allowing the section to apply when the taxpayer’s form arguably did not comport with the statutory requirements.
The Service’s concurrence to section 351 treatment was apparently
motivated by its desire to minimize taxpayer’s amortization deductions rather than seeking to achieve a sound policy outcome.
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INTRODUCTION
Over thirty years ago, Professor Ronald H. Jensen authored
an article in the Virginia Tax Review, titled “Of Form and Substance: Tax Free Incorporations and Other Transactions Under
Section 351.”1 Professor Jensen asserted that it was inappropriate
to utilize the step transaction doctrine to determine whether the
control requirement was met in a purported section 351 transaction,
involving a disposition of some, or all, of the transferor’s shares even
if effected by a binding contract made prior to the contribution.2
Professor Jensen provided a thorough analysis of decisions by the courts and rulings of the Internal Revenue Service
(Service) concerning whether or not the step transaction should be
utilized in this context.3 He also examined the legislative history
of a predecessor provision to section 351,4 as well as made a cogent
argument that the mere change in form rationale given by some
courts for nonrecognition treatment pursuant to section 351 is tenuous.5 Professor Jensen concluded that the courts and the Service:
[H]ave created a patchwork of irreconcilable decisions, inexplicable on the basis of logic or policy and virtually devoid of any
explanatory or predictive value. The result has been a series of
ad hoc decisions distinguishable only on the basis of their factual variations, with little or no explanation as to why such
factual variation justifies a particular result.6

He asserted that “[t]his lack of a consistent rationale has made both
prediction and rational development of the law virtually impossible.”7
There is no doubt of the many inconsistencies rendered by
the Service and the courts in addressing the use of the step transaction to determine whether the control test under section 351 has
been satisfied when there had been dispositions connected with
the initial contribution.8 Professor Jensen made a superb case as
See Ronald H. Jensen, Of Form and Substance: Tax-Free Incorporations
and Other Transactions Under Section 351, 11 VA. TAX REV. 349, 349 (1991).
2 Id. at 417.
3 See generally id.
4 See id. at 381–87.
5 See id. at 375–81.
6 Id. at 355–56.
7 Id. at 356.
8 See id. at 359–67.
1
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to why change is needed in this matter.9 Nevertheless, there are
sound policy reasons for the application of this judicial canon in
certain circumstances. Nullifying any role for the step transaction
doctrine in this context, is not justified.10 The Article includes a
discussion of some other proposals for addressing the dilemma,
including one put forth by tax attorney Stephen S. Bowen in an
article written a few years after Professor Jensen’s article.11
This Article will also consider the recent Tax Court decision, Complex Media, Inc. v. Commissioner, which addresses a
different facet of section 351 control.12 The case involved, inter alia,
the taxpayer’s successful attempt to invoke the step transaction
doctrine to treat as boot, payments made to one of the partners
of the transferor.13 Another aspect of the arrangement, however,
is particularly troubling and the reason why discussion of the case
is part of this Article examining section 351 control. This concerns
the taxpayer’s position regarding how the requisite ownership was
achieved.14 The court, at the behest of both parties, reluctantly
agreed to include an act, i.e., a merger, in allowing the section to
apply when the taxpayer’s form arguably did not comport with the
statutory requirements.15 The Service’s concurrence to section
351 treatment was apparently motivated by its desire to minimize
taxpayer’s amortization deductions rather than seeking to achieve
a sound policy outcome.16 This type of ephemeral strategy of the
Service can lead to what the late renowned tax lawyer and professor Martin Ginsburg characterized as the “law of Moses’ rod”:
“Every stick crafted to beat on the head of a taxpayer will, sooner

See id. at 424–26.
See infra notes 406–49 and accompanying text.
11 See infra notes 450–96 and accompanying text; Stephen S. Bowen, The
End Result Test, 72 TAXES 722, 722, 731, 737, 742 (1994).
12 See infra Part I; 121 T.C.M. (CCH) 1089, 22–24 (2021).
13 Complex Media, Inc., 121 T.C.M. (CCH) at 74–76.
14 See infra notes 77–97 and accompanying text.; Complex Media, Inc., 121
T.C.M. (CCH) at 30–32.
15 Complex Media, Inc., 121 T.C.M. (CCH) at 30–32.
16 Id. at 31 n.13. The Tax Court noted that the Service’s seemingly natural
path of trying to tax the transferors for a defective section 351 “would likely have
expired by now in the absence of extensions.” Id. It is also possible that the Service
in fact thoroughly analyzed the merger step, explained below, and was comfortable that it should count for determining section 351 control and there was no
consideration of the amount of the Taxpayer’s amortization deductions. Id. It
should have explained its reasoning for why section 351 applied in the briefs
that it filed with the court.
9

10
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or later, metamorphose into a large green snake and bite the
Commissioner on the hind part.”17
This Article will begin with a detailed discussion of the
Complex Media opinion,18 followed by a concise overview of the
step transaction doctrine in general,19 and close with an analysis
of its role in determining control for section 351 purposes when
there is a post contribution disposition of transferor’s shares connected with the initial transfer.20 This includes a detailed discussion of Professor Jensen’s analysis and recommendation, and
some possible alternatives.21 This Article is certainly, however,
not intended to provide the reader an exhaustive analysis of the
plethora of decisions and rulings in this area.
I.COMPLEX MEDIA V. COMMISSIONER
Complex Media, Inc. v. Commissioner involved asserted deficiencies by the Service with respect to amortization deductions
claimed by Complex Media, Inc. (the Taxpayer or petitioner) with
respect to intangible assets it acquired in November 2009 in a
transaction claimed by the Taxpayer, and stipulated by the Service,
to meet the requirements of section 351.22 Falling under the ambit
of section 351 has, inter alia, important implications with respect
to whether the initial inside basis to the transferee of the acquired
assets reflect the transferor’s carryover basis, with adjustments
for any gain recognized by the transferor pursuant to section 362(a),
or instead equals the contributed assets fair market value under
section 1012(a).23 This determination has important ramifications
with respect to the amount of amortization and other cost recovery deductions the transferee taxpayer is entitled to.24 As the Tax
Court explained, in the case of Complex Media, “[i]f section 351
did not apply to the transaction, it would be treated as a taxable

Martin Ginsburg, The National Office Mission, 27 TAX NOTES 99, 100 (1985).
18 See infra Part I.
19 See infra Section II.A.
20 See infra Section II.B.
21 See infra notes 406–96 and accompanying text.
22 See Complex Media, Inc. v. Comm’r, 121 T.C.M. (CCH) 1089, 6–10, 21–31
(2021).
23 See id. at 21–22, 32, 76.
24 See id. at 21–22.
17
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purchase and sale, and petitioner’s bases in any amortizable intangibles would be higher than those it claims.”25
The Complex name was fitting, with the Tax Court acknowledging that “[i]dentifying the issues that remain for decision has
proved a challenge, leading to our request that the parties address
in supplemental briefs a series of questions ... [but] [o]ur efforts
were not entirely successful.”26 The deficiencies at issue relate to the
Taxpayer’s 2010, 2011, 2012 and 2013 Federal income tax returns.27
The most troubling aspect of the decision was the court’s
reluctant decision for section 351 to apply.28 One article described
the outcome as one where “it appears that there was no factual basis to contend that section 351 applied to the transaction—except
that both parties claimed that it did.”29 In this respect, the court
was particularly critical of the Service, with the court stating that:
As far as we can tell, respondent relies entirely on section 351
in support of his position that petitioner’s bases in the assets
it acquired from CMH [the transferor] were limited by section
362(a) to their bases in CMH’s hands. Even so, respondent
does not explain in any detail why section 351 applies ....30

The Taxpayer too was somewhat evasive as to its assertion as to why the section applied.31 The Tax Court observed in

Id. at 21. The court detailed the different results from coming within
section 351 versus not meeting its requirements in a footnote:
If petitioner acquired the assets of the transferred business in
a taxable purchase and exchange, its basis in the amortizable
section 197 intangibles included in the exchange would equal
the fair market value of those assets, which, as explained infra part IV.D.6., we have determined to be $7,616,852. The
‘step-up’ in the basis of those assets resulting from the transaction would be $7,578,127 ($7,616,852 value - $38,725 basis
to CMH ($12,889 basis in trademarks + $25,836 basis in domain name))—an amount far in excess of the $3 million basis
step-up petitioner claimed on its returns.
Id. at 21 n.10.
26 Id. at 21.
27 Id. at 3.
28 Id. at 30–31.
29 Richard M. Lipton & Brandon King, Tax Court Decision in Complex Media
Involves “Complex” Analysis of Facts, Law, and Step Transaction Doctrine,
134 J. TAX’N 14, 14 (2021).
30 Complex Media, Inc., 121 T.C.M. (CCH) at 22.
31 See Petitioner’s Opening Brief at 30–34, Complex Media, Inc. v. Comm’r
of Internal Revenue, 121 T.C.M. (CCH) 1089 (2021) (No. 13368-15, 19898-17).
25
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this regard that “[i]n its opening brief, petitioner argues at some
length for the application of section 351, even though it leaves a
potentially critical issue unaddressed.”32
As explained below, this Article argues that the form of the
Complex Media transaction at least arguably did not comport with
the statutory requirements.33 The Service’s agreement to acquiesce to section 351 treatment was apparently motivated to minimize
taxpayer’s amortization deductions.34 It failed in its obligation to
try to help shape well-reasoned precedent as to when section 351
control has been met. By challenging such treatment, it would have
left it to the Tax Court to conclude the proper course of action rather
than to simply acquiesce to the parties’ agreement.35
By way of background, in May 2002, a print magazine with
the title “Complex Magazine” was established by Seth Gerszberg,
Marc Ecko and Mr. Ecko’s sister as “a vehicle to promote the retail clothing business they had been operating.”36 Online content
was later added, “and by 2006, Complex Magazine was aggressively involved on-line through Complex.com which was a network of the most popular advertising sites combined with the
magazine content.”37 The business was conducted prior to 2008
by two New Jersey limited liability companies, Complex Media
LLC (Media) and Complex Media THC LLC (Media THC).38 A third
New Jersey limited liability company, Complex Media Holdings
LLC (CMH) was formed in January 2008, to serve as a holding
company for the other limited liability companies.39 CMH was
owned by Gerszberg, Ecko, Richard Antoniello, who had previously been hired to run the magazine and who had added the online
context, and Michael Golden, who joined the business later.40
While the business “was successful in capitalizing on the
increased popularity of online media, the overall business ... experienced financial difficulties because of a decline in the retail
Complex Media, Inc., 121 T.C.M. (CCH) at 22.
See infra notes 184–90.
34 See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
35 See Complex Media, Inc., 121 T.C.M. (CCH) at 29–31, 31 n.13.
36 Petitioner’s Opening Brief, supra note 31, at 5.
37 Id. at 6.
38 See id.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 5–6.
32
33
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clothing business.”41 The need for additional financing prompted
the plan at issue in this case.42 OnNetworks, Inc. (ONI or OnNetworks) was identified as a potential investor.43 ONI “had raised
about $19 million from the issuance of common and preferred stock
but lost most of it in pursuit of an unsuccessful business venture.”44
ONI had only about $6.3 million in cash left as of early 2009,
which was less than the ONI preferred shareholders’ liquidation
preference.45 There developed friction between ONI’s preferred
shareholders and Gerszberg.46 A final plan was eventually
reached between the parties and was implemented in November
2009.47 Pursuant to this plan, “a portion of OnNetworks’ remaining cash would be used to redeem Mr. Gerszberg’s interest in
CMH and the remainder used as operating capital for the transferred business.”48
Through several agreements, all dated on or as of November 25, 2009, the transaction that was the subject of the Tax
Court litigation was implemented.49 These included “the CM & JV
Agreement [CMJVA] among petitioner, CMH, OnNetworks, and
an acquisition subsidiary of petitioner; an Asset Purchase Agreement between CMH and its two subsidiaries; a Stock Repurchase
Agreement between petitioner and CMH; and a Unit Purchase
Agreement between CMH and Mr. Gerszberg.”50
Pursuant to the Asset Purchase Agreement, CMH acquired
assets from its two limited liability companies, which included “all
‘Intellectual Property’ (broadly defined) ‘used in or useful to the
Business’[,]” but excluded certain specified properties (which encompassed cash, receivables and certain specified contracts).51
Under the CMJVA, CMH contributed these purchased assets to
the Taxpayer.52 In return, CMH “was entitled to receive 4,999,000

Id. at 7.
Complex Media, Inc. v. Comm’r, 121 T.C.M. (CCH) 1089, 5 (2021).
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 Id. at 5–6.
46 Id. at 6.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 Id. at 7, 7 n.2.
52 Id. at 9.
41
42
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of ... [the Taxpayer’s] common stock.”53 Also pursuant to the
CMJVA, an acquisition subsidiary of the Taxpayer simultaneously merged into ONI, with ONI surviving, as a subsidiary of the
Taxpayer.54 As discussed in the Tax Court memorandum opinion,
the Taxpayer’s assertion that the control requirements of section
351 were satisfied was based “on the proposition that the OnNetworks preferred shareholders were transferors in the transaction along with CMH.”55
The Tax Court pointed out that “[t]he merger of petitioner’s
acquisition subsidiary into OnNetworks was approved by a shareholder consent executed by one of OnNetworks’ common shareholders and six of its preferred shareholders, who together held
stock with 67.5% of the voting rights of all of the OnNetworks
stock.”56 In the merger, ONI’s formerly preferred shareholders
received 2,731,808 preferred shares in the Taxpayer,57 and ONI’s
former common stock was cancelled without any consideration.58
The Tax Court noted that there were inconsistencies with
respect to how the Taxpayer and the other parties to the transaction viewed the ONI merger.59 The CMJVA “expresses the intent
of the parties to that agreement that the merger of petitioner’s
acquisition subsidiary into OnNetworks qualify as a reorganization within the meaning of Section 368(a) of the Code.”60 The Tax
Court indicated, however, that “[b]y contrast the description of

See id.
Id.
55 See id. at 24.
56 Id. at 9.
57 Id. The 2,731,808 preferred shares in the Taxpayer, owned by the former ONI preferred shareholders “could be converted into 3,122,843 common
shares of [the Taxpayer].” Id. at 13 n.7.
58 Id. at 10. The Tax Court explained that:
[f]or the purpose of allocating merger consideration among
OnNetworks shareholders, the merger was treated as a liquidation under the terms of OnNetworks’ certificate of incorporation because the aggregate merger consideration did not constitute a majority voting interest in petitioner. Because the value of
the merger consideration was less than the liquidation preference
to which OnNetworks preferred shareholders were entitled, they
received all of that consideration.
Id. at 10 n.5.
59 See id. at 10.
60 Id.
53
54
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the expected Federal income tax consequences of the merger included in the Information Statement prepared in connection with
the transaction states: ‘In general, the Merger will be treated as
a non-taxable transaction to the stockholders under Section 351
of the Code.’”61
The Stock Repurchase Agreement “provided for CMH’s sale
of 1,875,000 of ... [the Taxpayer’s] common stock back to ... [the
Taxpayer] in exchange for $3 million in cash, with $2.7 million
to be paid at closing on November 25, 2009, and an additional payment of $300,000 to be made on January 3, 2011.”62 Gerszberg’s
interest in CMH was bought out pursuant to the Unit Repurchase
Agreement.63 In redemption of 1,875,000 shares of the Taxpayer’s
common stock, he received through his ownership in CMH, “an
immediate payment of $2.7 million in cash and the partnership’s
assignment to Mr. Gerszberg of its right to the additional future
cash payment.”64
In terms of tax reporting by the parties, the Form 1065
partnership tax return filed by CMH did not reflect the receipt from
the Taxpayer of $2.7 million in cash to redeem Gerszberg’s interest.65 Gerszberg’s 2009 Form 1040 does, however, report $4,262,162
of long-term capital gain in connection with the redemption of
his interest in CMH, representing the excess of the $2.7 million
cash received and a reported negative basis of $1,562,142.66 His
Form 1040 for 2011 reflected as “Other income” the $300,000
received from the Taxpayer.67 $4,808 was reported as an amortization expense by CMH in 2009.68 This related to eight trademarks
and a domain name.69 The same $4,808 was reflected in the Taxpayer’s returns for the years at issue as a carryover basis from
the transfer from CMH,70 along with

Id.
62 Id. at 11.
63 Id. at 10.
64 Id. at 12.
65 See id. at 14. Neither did it reflect the right to $300,000 of additional payment due January 3, 2011. See id. at 11.
66 See id. at 17.
67 Id.
68 Id. at 14.
69 See id.
70 Id.
61
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an additional $200,000 in respect of an ‘intangible asset’ acquired
on November 25, 2009, with an unadjusted cost or basis of $3
million (equal to the sum of the $2.7 million immediate cash payment and the $300,000 deferred payment petitioner was required
to make in the redemption of 1,875,000 of the shares.71

The Taxpayer’s returns also reflected other deductions for depreciation and amortization.72 The Taxpayer’s and CMH’s 2009 tax
returns provided disclosures “under section 1.351-3, Income Tax
Regs. [that] ... the transferred assets [had] a fair market value of
$8 million and an aggregate basis of $237,702.”73
For the years at issue, the Service had disallowed certain
amortization deductions claimed by the Taxpayer.74 Pursuant to
section 197, an item’s cost is amortized “ratably over the 15-year
period beginning with the month in which such intangible was
acquired”75 if it comes within the statutory definition of “amortizable section 197 intangible.”76 Professors Boris T. Bittker and
Lawrence Lokken observed that “[t]his term includes most intangibles acquired in the purchase of a trade or business and a
few separately acquired intangibles.”77 The Tax Court explained
that “[i]f a section 351 exchange includes a section 197 intangible, the transferee corporation is treated as the transferor shareholder ‘with respect to so much of the adjusted basis in the hands

Id. at 14–15.
See id. at 15.
73 Id. at 16.
74 See id. at 17.
75 I.R.C. § 197(a).
76 I.R.C. § 197(b).
77 BORIS T. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FED. TAX’N INCOME, EST.& GIFTS ¶
23.4.2 (2d/3d ed. 1993–2019, updated Mar. 2021). The Tax Court elaborated that:
To qualify as “amortizable section 197 intangibles”, most section 197 intangibles have to meet three conditions. First, the
taxpayer must have acquired the asset after August 10, 1993
(section 197’s date of enactment). Sec. 197(c)(1)(A). Second, the
taxpayer has to hold the asset in connection with the conduct
of a trade or business or other income-producing activity. Sec.
197(c)(1)(B). And third, subject to enumerated exceptions, the
asset cannot have been created by the taxpayer. Sec. 197(c)(2).
The exclusion for self-created intangibles does not apply to governmental licenses or permits, covenants not to compete, franchises, trademarks, or trade names.
Complex Media, Inc., 121 T.C.M. (CCH) at 19.
71
72
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of the ... [corporation] as does not exceed the adjusted basis in the
hands of the transferor.’”78 In other words, “[t]he corporation, in
effect, steps into the transferor’s shoes and can ‘continue to amortize its adjusted basis, to the extent it does not exceed the transferor’s adjusted basis, ratably over the remainder of the transferor’s
15-year amortization period.”79 In addition, “[a]ny increase in
the basis of the section 197 intangible allowed by section 362(a)
as a result of gain recognized by the shareholder is treated as
though the corporation acquired the asset other than in a section
351 exchange (i.e., by purchase).”80
The Taxpayer’s assertion that section 351 applied presumably was dictated by what was best taxwise for the CMH
partners, which was to limit the recognition of realized gain as
much as possible by virtue of section 351, and “the duty of consistency.”81 As noted, one might surmise that the Service’s seemingly unprincipled position to agree that the transaction came
under section 351 was apparently motivated by its goal of limiting the Taxpayer’s amortization deductions, under circumstances
when assessing the CMH partners for a flawed section 351 transfer was barred by the statute of limitations.82

Complex Media, Inc., 121 T.C.M. (CCH) at 20 (citing § 197(f)(2)(A)).
79 Id.
80 Id. at 21 (citing Reg. § 1.197-2(g)(2)(ii)(B)).
81 Id. at 30–31. In a footnote the Tax Court stated that:
[W]e cannot rule out the possibility that petitioner’s abandonment
of its sec. 351 theory would be contrary to factual representations made by CMH or its partners on which the Commissioner
relied in determining the partners’ tax liabilities for their taxable years ended December 31, 2009. The period of limitations on
assessing deficiencies in the partners’ tax for those years
would likely have expired by now in the absence of extensions.
See sec. 6501(a). Were petitioner to abandon its claim that the
exchange in issue was covered by sec. 351 and, in response,
respondent invoked the duty of consistency, we would need to
determine whether the economic interests of CMH and petitioner were sufficiently identical for representations made by
CMH and its partners to be binding on petitioner. It suffices
for present purposes to note that, not only has petitioner consistently argued for the application of sec. 351; it might be prevented from arguing to the contrary.
Id. at 31 n.13.
82 See id. at 21. As noted in an earlier footnote, this might be unfair and the
Service could possibly have concluded that the ONI merger satisfied the requisite
78
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Without the possible application of the ONI merger, it was
abundantly clear that control requirement for section 351 was not
fulfilled.83 The Tax Court explained that “[t]he 5 million common
shares in petitioner that CMH would have held without regard
to the immediate redemption of 1,875,000 of those shares would
have provided CMH with only about 61.6% of the aggregate voting power of all of control of petitioner immediately after the
exchange.”84 Furthermore, the Tax Court, citing Intermountain
Lumber Co. v. Commissioner,85 discussed in Section II.B of this
Article stated the redemption of the 1,875,000 of the Taxpayer’s
common stock issued to CMH needed to be considered in determining control, since “CMH was not free to determine whether
to keep those 1,875,000 shares.”86 That is, after one gives effect to
the Unit Purchase Agreement, “the redemption reduced CMH’s
share of the aggregate voting power of petitioner’s outstanding
voting stock from about 61.6% to just over 50% (3,125,000 ÷
(3,125,000 + 3,122,843) = 50.02%).”87
The Taxpayer asserted that the ONI merger provided the
requisite control.88 More precisely, the Taxpayer argued that under
the CMJVA, the transactions:
For income tax purposes, [should be treated] as a simultaneous (i) contribution of certain operating assets by CMH to Petitioner in exchange for common stock in Petitioner and (ii)
contribution of the outstanding stock of ONI by the preferred
stockholders of ONI to Petitioner in exchange for all of the
preferred stock of Petitioner.89


control for section 351 to apply. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. If so,
the Service certainly should have explained this to the Tax Court.
83 See Complex Media, Inc., 121 T.C.M. at 22–23.
84 Id.; The Tax Court described the calculation of the 61.6% figure as follows: “(5,000,000 ÷ (5,000,000 + 3,122,843 common shares into which petitioner’s
preferred stock was convertible)).” Id. at 23.
85 See 65 T.C. 1025, 1034 (1976).
86 Complex Media, Inc., 121 T.C.M. at 24.
87 Id. at 24. The Taxpayer in fact argued that the redemption should be considered part of the section 351 transaction pursuant to the step transaction
doctrine, which provided it with additional amortizable inside basis if boot
characterization (as part of a section 351 transaction) was ultimately respected,
which it was. See id. at 65.
88 Id. at 24.
89 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

2022] APPLICATION OF STEP TRANSACTION DOCTRINE 345
Under the Taxpayer’s theory, which the Tax Court grudgingly acceded to because of the Service’s acquiescence, there were “the two
transferors, ... CMH and the preferred stockholders of ONI, [which
together] owned 100% of the outstanding stock of Petitioner.”90
The Tax Court spent several pages explaining why the Taxpayer’s position that section 351 applied was at least arguably
unsound, before it reluctantly acceded to the parties’ agreement
in this matter.91 The court concluded this aspect of the case by
stating that “[a]lthough we are not convinced that, as a matter of
law, petitioner’s acquisition of the assets of the transferred business was part of an exchange to which section 351 applies, we
will treat it as such in disposing of the cases before us.”92 The Tax
Court may have thought this proper because both parties agreed
to this treatment.93 It is certainly, however, worth considering
the court’s reasoning as to why utilizing the ONI merger to establish the necessary control was, at least, questionable.
The Tax Court stated at the outset of its analysis that
“[c]ontrary to petitioner’s characterization of the transaction, OnNetworks’ preferred shareholders did not actually contribute any
property to petitioner.”94 Furthermore, “the stock the OnNetworks
preferred shareholders surrendered in the merger was not the same
type of stock that petitioner received in the merger.”95 This is because the Taxpayer’s shares in ONI were obtained by “conversion
in the merger of its common stock in its acquisition subsidiary.”96
The Tax Court pointed out that “[i]n implicit recognition
that it did not actually receive property from the OnNetworks
preferred shareholders, petitioner cites Rev. Rul. 67-448, 1967-2
C.B. 144 ....”97 The Taxpayer’s theory was that:

Id. at 25.
91 See id. at 30.
92 Id.
93 See id.
94 Id. at 25. In a footnote the court added that ONI’s “preferred shareholders could not have contributed to petitioner ‘the outstanding stock’ of OnNetworks because they did not own all of that stock. Other shareholders owned
common stock in OnNetworks until that stock was canceled in the merger.”
Id. at 25 n.11.
95 Id. at 25.
96 See id.
97 Id.
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Where a parent corporation [i.e., the Taxpayer] forms a transitory merger subsidiary which merges into a target corporation
[i.e., ONI], with the target corporation surviving, and the parent
corporation then issues its stock to the former shareholders of
the target corporation, the transaction is treated as an acquisition by the parent corporation of the stock of the target.98

The court indicated that the ruling amounted to a pre-section
368(a)(2)(E) reverse triangular merger that the Service found was
qualified as a “B” reorganization, i.e., section 368(a)(1)(B).99 The
Tax Court pointed out, however, that the Taxpayer “fail[ed] to
acknowledge potentially material differences between the facts posited in Rev. Rul. 67-448 ... and those of its transaction.”100 The
Tax Court explained:
The ruling [Rev. Rul. 67-448] involved an acquiring corporation,
P, that sought to acquire the business of a public utility, Y. Because of Y’s status as a regulated entity, its corporate existence
had to be maintained—that is, P had to acquire Y’s stock rather
than its assets. But not all of the Y shareholders were willing
to surrender their Y stock to P. So P transferred shares of its
voting stock to an acquisition subsidiary, S, in exchange for S
stock. S then merged into Y. In the merger, P’s stock in S was
converted into Y stock. ... The Y stock that P ended up owning
was the same type of stock that Y’s former shareholders had
owned. The ruling gives no indication that Y had more than
one class of stock outstanding before the merger. By contrast,
the results of the merger by which petitioner acquired OnNetworks cannot be readily explained without acknowledging
the role played by petitioner’s acquisition subsidiary.... [T]he stock
that petitioner ended up with—OnNetworks common stock—
was not the type of stock held by those OnNetworks shareholders
who participated in the merger. Treating the OnNetworks preferred shareholders as transferors in the exchange in which
petitioner acquired the assets of the transferred business would
require not only disregarding petitioner’s acquisition subsidiary
but also treating the OnNetworks preferred stock as being, in
substance, common stock.101


Id. at 25–26.
99 See id. at 26.
100 Id. at 27.
101 Id. at 26, 28. There were other rulings where the Service held that stock
received by transferors should be aggregated with stock received in reorganizations for purpose of determining if the section 351 control requirement was
met. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 68-357, 1968-2 C.B. 144 & Rev. Rul. 76-123, 1976-1 C.B.
98
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Next, the Tax Court criticized an assertion by the Taxpayer
that “before the merger of its acquisition subsidiary into OnNetworks, ‘[t]he ONI Preferred Shareholders ... represented all of
ONI’s remaining shareholders.’”102 The Tax Court stated that this
“suggestion is factually inaccurate. The common stock of OnNetworks outstanding before the merger was not canceled until
the effective time of the merger.”103
Preemptively, the Tax Court addressed the differences between the Supreme Court decision of Helvering v. Alabama Asphaltic Limestone Co.104 and the case at bar.105 Alabama Asphaltic
Limestone addressed whether a transaction qualified as a tax-free
reorganization where the taxpayer had acquired assets of an insolvent corporation.106 The Tax Court pointed out that the Court
rejected the Service’s argument that this was not a valid reorganization “because the shareholders of the insolvent corporation
did not maintain a propriety interest in the taxpayer.”107 The
Court reasoned “that the equity interest in the insolvent corporation had shifted, at some point before the transaction in issue,
from the corporation’s shareholders to its creditors.”108 The Tax
Court believed that there were major differences between the transaction it was assessing and that of Alabama Asphaltic Limestone.109
The Tax Court noted that:
By contrast, it is not obvious that the decline in value of OnNetworks assets below the liquidation preference of its preferred
stock gave its preferred shareholders “effective command” over
the disposition of the corporation’s property. That the shareholder
consent that approved the merger was joined by one of OnNetworks’ common shareholders suggests that the corporation’s


94. In Rev. Rul. 84-44, however, the Service held that in a Section 368(a)(1)(D)
forward triangular merger, the shares of the entity X being merged into S, a
subsidiary of P, “are not taken into account with the P stock received by Y [a
transferor of property to P] in determining whether the requirements of section 351 of the Code have been met.” 1984-1 C.B. 105.
102 See Complex Media, Inc., 121 T.C.M. (CCH) at 28.
103 Id.
104 See 315 U.S. 179, 184–85 (1942).
105 See Complex Media, Inc., 121 T.C.M. (CCH) at 26.
106 Helvering, 315 U.S. at 180–81.
107 Complex Media, Inc., 121 T.C.M. (CCH) at 29.
108 Id.
109 Id. (citing Helvering v. Ala. Asphaltic Limestone Co., 315 U.S. 179 (1942)).

348 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 13:331
preferred shareholders did not have sufficient voting power, by
themselves, to approve the transaction. If the holders of the
OnNetworks preferred stock could not have unilaterally approved
the merger, or forced a liquidation of the corporation, they
would have had less control over the disposition of the corporation’s assets than the creditors of the insolvent corporation
in Ala. Asphaltic.110

The Service’s concession as to the applicability of the ONI
merger in satisfying the section 351 control test precluded the
court from providing a definitive decision as to how much deviation in form is permissible.111 It is submitted that it would have
been far better in the interest of sound tax administration had this
issue been properly adjudicated.112 The revenue loss from enhanced amortization deductions by virtue of a stepped-up inside
tax basis should not have been the Service’s primary concern.
The Tax Court’s remaining decision-making, after it assumed section 351 applied, is certainly worth examining. First,
the Tax Court categorically rejected the Service’s assertion that
the Taxpayer had not acquired amortizable assets from CMH.113
The Tax Court indicated that “[a]ccepting that petitioner acquired
the assets of the transferred business in a section 351 exchange,
it follows that petitioner stepped into CMH’s shoes in regard to
the amortization of any amortizable section 197 intangibles included in the transfer.”114 The court later commented that it did
“not understand respondent’s repeated denials that petitioner
acquired amortizable ... intangibles from CMH.”115 It characterized the Service’s position as “demonstrably incorrect.”116
The Tax Court was troubled by the Service’s apparent misunderstanding of the facts, stating that its “position [not to treat
the Taxpayer as receiving amortizable section 197 intangibles from

Id. at 29–30 (citing Ala. Asphaltic Limestone Co., 315 U.S.)
111 Id. at 30–31.
112 See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
113 Complex Media, Inc., 121 T.C.M. (CCH) at 34.
114 Id. at 32.
115 Id. The Tax Court also pointed out that the Service initially argued
that the Taxpayer was not entitled to any amortization deductions “[b]ut the
Stipulation of Facts that the parties executed on the day of trial suggests that
respondent now accepts that petitioner is entitled to $4,808 of the $204,808
that he initially disallowed.” Id.
116 Id.
110
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CMH] may be explained, in part, by ... [its] apparent confusion
about the relevant transaction.”117 The court explained that “[a]lthough respondent consistently refers to the transaction in which
petitioner acquired the assets of the transferred business as a
‘merger/reorganization,’ it was neither.”118 The Tax Court observed
that “[c]oncurrently with petitioner’s acquisition from CMH of the
assets of the transferred business, petitioner’s acquisition subsidiary merged into OnNetworks. But those two transactions
were distinct.”119 The court further expounded that “[i]n the merger,
petitioner exchanged the stock of its acquisition subsidiary for
OnNetworks stock. It acquired nothing in the merger from CMH;
the partnership did not participate in the merger.”120
The Tax Court then addressed the Taxpayer’s ability to
disavow the form of the transaction with respect to the redemption of some of the Taxpayer’s shares held by CMH to finance
Gerszberg’s exit.121 The court explained that “[u]nder the form of
the transaction prescribed by the governing agreements, CMH’s
transfer of the assets of the transferred business and petitioner’s
redemption of some of the common shares CMH was entitled to
receive for those assets were separate transactions.”122 The Service’s position was that the Taxpayer “cannot treat the cash and
deferred payment right as boot in the section 351 exchange.”123
Instead of drawing the line with respect to whether section 351
control was met, the Service did so with respect to the Taxpayer’s
assertion that the redemption of its shares from CMH should be
treated as the payment of taxable boot in a section 351 transfer.124 In challenging boot treatment, the Service asserted that
the Taxpayer was “bound by ... the terms of the relevant agreements [and] or the form of the transactions carried out under the
agreements.”125 If the Service had succeeded with this argument,
which it didn’t,126 the Taxpayer’s inside basis would not have

Id. at 33.
Id.
119 Id.
120 Id. (footnote omitted).
121 Id. at 48.
122 Id. at 36.
123 Id. at 38.
124 Id. at 71.
125 Id. at 38.
126 Id. at 47.
117
118
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been stepped up to reflect boot income to the transferor.127 Under this theory, CMH should have reported its receipt of boot.128
The Service stated that the CMJVA “provided that the sole
consideration to which CMH was entitled in exchange for the transferred assets was 4,999,000 shares of petitioner’s common stock,
and ... under the Stock Repurchase Agreement, CMH received
the $2.7 million cash and $300,000 deferred payment right in
redemption of 1,875,000 shares of petitioner’s common stock.”129
In other words, the form was two distinct transactions.130 It was
not one in which the Taxpayer “had acquired the assets of the
transferred business in exchange for 3,124,000 shares of its common
stock and $3 million in current and deferred cash payments.”131 The
form “instead [was that] of acquiring those assets for 4,999,000
shares of common stock and then immediately redeeming 1,875,000
of those shares in exchange for the cash payments.”132
In analyzing how the law applied to the facts in the case,
the Tax Court complained that “[b]oth parties have been somewhat casual in distinguishing between a taxpayer’s disavowal of
the terms of a contract and disavowal of the form of the transactions implemented under those terms.”133 It was particularly
critical of the Taxpayer who “insists that it ‘is not attempting to
in any way vary the terms of the operative agreements ...’ [and]
alleges that ‘there was never any redemption of 1,875,000 shares
of Petitioner’s common stock.’”134 The Tax Court commented
that “[i]f petitioner means that the transactional form was other
than a transfer of assets for stock and an immediate redemption
of some of that stock, it is disavowing the terms of the relevant
agreements, which clearly provide for those two separate steps.”135

Id. at 65.
128 Id. at 14.
129 Id. at 38.
130 Id.
131 Id. at 43.
132 Id.
133 Id. at 47.
134 Id.
135 Id. The Tax Court indicated that if instead that the Taxpayer’s position
was based on “its failure to issue a certificate representing the 4,999,000 common
shares it was required to issue and then immediately redeem, that claim, though
supported by the record, is irrelevant.” Id. At an earlier point in the case, the Tax
Court noted that the Taxpayer acknowledged it “‘envisioned’ a redemption of
127
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The court ultimately determined that the Taxpayer was
permitted to “invoke the substance-over-form doctrine” to disavow
the form of the contracts.136 In reaching this conclusion, the Tax
Court thought that the cases cited by the Service, including the
Supreme Court decision, Commissioner v. National Alfalfa Dehydrating & Milling Co., “do not erect an absolute bar to petitioner’s
disavowal of the form of its transactions.”137 The Tax Court acknowledged that at first glance, language in that case articulating
what has “sometimes [been] referred to as the ‘non-disavowal principle’”,138 “would, if read in isolation, suggest an absolute prohibition.”139 The language the court was referring to stated that
“[w]hile a taxpayer is free to organize his affairs as he chooses,
nevertheless, once having done so, he must accept the tax consequences of his choice, whether contemplated or not ... and may
not enjoy the benefit of some other route he might have chosen
to follow but did not.”140 The Tax Court reasoned that if one considered the entire opinion, this sentence “should be interpreted
to mean only that a taxpayer’s ability to identify an alternative
path to a given end result that provides more favorable tax consequences than the path actually taken is not enough to entitle
the taxpayer to the desired tax treatment.”141
In applying the facts of National Alfalfa to the case at bar,
the Tax Court indicated that the Supreme Court decision “establishes only that petitioner cannot justify the claimed amortization deductions merely by observing that it would have been
entitled to a step-up in the bases of the transferred assets had
the $2.7 million of cash and $300,000 deferred payment right
been boot in the section 351 exchange.”142

1,875,000 of the shares of common stock that it was required to issue to CMH ...
[,]but claims that the redemption ‘did not happen.’” Id. at 42–43. The Tax Court
then chided the Taxpayer that “[n]otwithstanding its claim that the redemption
did not actually happen, petitioner devotes considerable attention to the step
transaction doctrine, the applicability of which would be irrelevant if, in actual
form, the transaction had involved only one step instead of two.” Id. at 43.
136 Id. at 73.
137 Id. at 48.
138 Id. at 38.
139 Id. at 48.
140 Comm’r v. Nat’l Alfalfa Dehydrating Milling, 417 U.S. 134, 149 (1974).
141 Complex Media, Inc., 121 T.C.M. (CCH) at 48.
142 Id. at 51.
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A decision that was a major crux of the Service’s argument,
that the Taxpayer should not be allowed to disavow the form taken,
was Commissioner v. Danielson.143 Danielson stands for the rule
that “a party can challenge the tax consequences of his agreement
as construed by the Commissioner only by adducing proof which
in an action between the parties to the agreement would be admissible to alter that construction or to show its unenforceability
because of mistake, undue influence, fraud, duress, etc.”144
In its challenge to the applicability of Danielson, the Taxpayer argued that its fact pattern “present[ed] none of the concerns underlying the Danielson rule and the strong proof test ...
[including that] [t]here is no whipsaw potentially requiring the
Respondent to litigate against multiple parties.”145 The Tax Court
ultimately rejected Danielson’s applicability, stating that “[t]o the
extent that the Danielson rule limits a taxpayer’s eligibility to
disavow the form of its transactions as well as the terms of the
contracts that govern those transactions; however, the rule has
no application to the cases before us.”146 This is because the Tax
Court has “never accepted” this rule and only applies it when
the case is appealable to a court subscribing to Danielson pursuant to the doctrine of Golson v. Commissioner.147
Having decided it was not precluded per se from disavowing the form of the transaction when its substance differs, the
court next addressed what the Taxpayer “must show to disavow
the form of the transactions.”148 The court grappled with the questions as to whether a taxpayer must show more than the Service
when it argues the form chosen should be ignored to reflect the
economic substance and, “if so, what is the nature and quantum
of the required additional showing?”149
After it examined the relevant case law, the Tax Court
opined that more recent decisions reflect that the Tax Court “has
become more hospitable to taxpayers seeking to disavow the form
of their transactions.”150 The court, however, concluded that there

378 F.2d 771, 775 (3d Cir. 1967).
Comm’r v. Danielson, 378 F.2d 772, 775 (3d Cir. 1967).
145 Complex Media, Inc., 121 T.C.M. (CCH) at 45–46.
146 Id. at 53.
147 Id.; Golson v. Comm’r, 54 T.C. 742, 758 (1970).
148 Complex Media, Inc., 121 T.C.M. (CCH) at 55.
149 Id.
150 Id. at 63.
143
144
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was an additional burden for a taxpayer to do so in comparison
to the Service.151 The Tax Court indicated that this relates “not to
the quantum of evidence but instead to its content.”152 Specifically,
the Tax Court set forth the following standard to be applied:
The Commissioner can succeed in disregarding the form of a
transaction by showing that the form in which the taxpayer cast
the transaction does not reflect its economic substance. For the
taxpayer to disavow the form it chose (or at least acquiesced
to), it must make that showing and more. In particular, the
taxpayer must establish that the form of the transaction was
not chosen for the purpose of obtaining tax benefits (to either
the taxpayer itself ... or to a counterparty ...) that are inconsistent with those the taxpayer seeks through disregarding
that form. When the form that the taxpayer seeks to disavow
was chosen for reasons other than providing tax benefits inconsistent with those the taxpayer seeks, the policy concerns
articulated in Danielson will not be present.153

While the Tax Court expressed some concerns with the
Taxpayer’s arguments, the court focused on:
Why the parties did not adopt that transactional form to begin
with. And the parties had an obvious nontax reason for structuring the transactions as they did: Petitioner could not have
paid CMH $2.7 million in cash in exchange for the assets it
received from CMH because it did not have any cash until after the exchange.154

That is, it needed the cash gained from ONI, and “[o]nly
then did petitioner have the wherewithal to pay CMH the cash
Mr. Gerszberg apparently demanded for the redemption of his
partnership interest.”155 Furthermore, the Tax Court observed
that it could have achieved its business objectives and a steppedup inside basis if it had issued a $3 million note along with the
3,124,000 shares as consideration for CMH’s assets.156

Id. at 58.
152 Id. at 64.
153 Id.
154 Id. at 72.
155 Id.
156 Id. The Tax Court envisioned that such a note’s terms “could have called for
repayment of $2.7 million before the close of business on November 25, 2009,
151
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The Tax Court next addressed the application of the step
transaction doctrine to link the redemption to the CMH asset transfer.157 This was not a hard decision for the court.158 The Tax
Court declared that “[i]f the step transaction doctrine has any
potency, it necessarily applies to combine a first step that occurs
when a preexisting obligation requires the immediate execution
of a second step that undoes the first.”159 These steps were clearly
mutually interdependent; there would have been no transfer of
the CMH assets to the Taxpayer without the payment necessary
for Gerszberg’s departure from the business.160 The Tax Court
elaborated that this was not an instance where a taxpayer is “asking us to skip, collapse, or rearrange the steps.”161 Furthermore,
the Taxpayer was “not even asking to rearrange steps actually
taken.”162 The Tax Court “conclude[d] that petitioner should be
treated as having acquired the assets of the transferred business
in exchange for 3,124,000 shares of its common stock, $2.7 million in cash, and an obligation to make an additional payment of
$300,000 on January 3, 2011.”163
Taxpayer’s inside basis, and the resulting amortization
deductions, was the next issue dealt with by the Tax Court.164 First,
the Tax Court rejected the Service’s assertion that step-up in
basis was not permitted because there was no gain reported for
the transfer.165 The Tax Court, in dismissing the Service’s argument, stated that “[b]y its plain terms, section 362(a) allows
the transferee corporation in a section 351 exchange to increase
its bases in transferred assets by ‘the amount of gain recognized
and payment of the remaining balance of $300,000 on January 3, 2011.” Id.
The Tax Court speculated that the reason such a structure was not undertaken was because “the prospect of a step-up in corporate asset basis was an
afterthought—perhaps arising only when petitioner’s accountants began preparing its 2010 return.” Id. at 73.
157 Id. at 74.
158 Id.
159 Id. at 74–75. For a general discussion of the step transaction test, see
infra Section II.A.
160 Complex Media, Inc., 121 T.C.M. (CCH) at 74–75.
161 Id. at 75.
162 Id.
163 Id. at 76.
164 Id. at 76–77.
165 Id. at 77.
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to the transferor’, without regard to whether the transferor reports
that recognized gain.”166 The Tax Court indicated that pursuant
to Revenue Ruling 68-55,167 “cash or other taxable boot should
be allocated among the various assets in proportion to their relative fair market values.”168 It did, however, point out that the
Taxpayer was not allowed section 197 amortization for the full
$3 million.169 For one, the deferred payment right to the additional $300,000 needed to be discounted to reflect the time value
of money.170 Additionally, some of the basis should be ascribed to
assets other than section 197 intangibles.171
The Tax Court then addressed the Taxpayer’s request
that since it had not done an appraisal of the transferred assets
at the time of the transaction, the court should “apply the ‘principal’ established in Cohan v. Commissioner ... and ‘make an
estimate of the proper amortizable step-up in basis for the contributed assets resulting from the ‘boot’ payment.’”172 The Service had objected to this on grounds that the Taxpayer “failed to
establish a reliable basis for the Court to make an estimated determination.”173 The court determined “that, even without a formal valuation, the record allows us to estimate the relative values
of those assets of the transferred business that did and did not
qualify as amortizable section 197 intangibles.”174 The Tax
Court, however, “disagree[d] with the petitioner that the circumstances do not warrant our bearing against it in estimating
the relative values of the transferred assets.”175 The court criticized the Taxpayer for being “[un]prepared to present evidence
at trial to establish all facts necessary to justify the full
$204,808 of amortization deductions it claimed in respect of intangible assets it acquired from CMH.”176 Because of this, the

Id. (footnote omitted).
167 Rev. Rul. 68-55, 1968-1 C.B. 140.
168 Complex Media, Inc., 121 T.C.M. (CCH) at 78.
169 Id. at 80.
170 Id.
171 Id.
172 Id. at 81 (citing Cohan v. Comm’r, 39 F.2d 540, 543–44 (2d Cir. 1930)).
173 Id. at 85.
174 Id. at 87–88.
175 Id. at 88.
176 Id. at 92.
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Tax Court “endeavor[ed] to ‘bear[ ] heavily’ against [P]etitioner
in estimating those relative values.”177
While the Tax Court “accept[ed] petitioner’s basic methodology [for determining the basis of its assets] as consistent with, and
supported by, the residual method of basis allocation ... [it rejected the Taxpayer’s] specific estimates.”178 Among the modifications the Tax Court made to the Taxpayer’s proposed inside basis
allocations was the court’s use of a different discount rate than
that advanced by the Taxpayer in valuing the deferred payment
right,179 and its utilizing of the original cost instead of book value
for certain fixed assets.180
While some might question some aspects of the court’s decision to treat the redemption as boot under the circumstances,
including the Taxpayer’s right to invoke (but not the application
of) the step transaction doctrine,181 this was a very carefully deliberated case where the Tax Court thoroughly analyzed the many
issues it had to address.182 One commentary, however, expressed
amazement at its outcomes:
If most tax practitioners were asked whether a taxpayer could
apply the step transaction doctrine against the IRS, most would
say that is not easy because a taxpayer must live with the
form they chose. If the question arose in a situation in which
the taxpayer did not consistently maintain a position concerning how the transaction should be treated, the tax practitioners would likely say “no way.” Furthermore, if asked whether
a transaction could be viewed as a transfer subject to Section
351 when control was not present immediately after the transaction, most tax practitioners would again say “no way.” ...
But perhaps the greatest surprise in the opinion in Complex
Media was the court’s treatment of Danielson.183

The most frustrating aspect of the decision was the Service’s
failure to challenge the section 351 treatment leaving this part of
the case undecided.184 The Tax Court should have been allowed

Id. at 93 (citing in part Cohan, 39 F.2d at 544).
Id.
179 Id. at 94–95.
180 Id. at 96–97.
181 See Lipton & King, supra note 29, at 18, 20–21.
182 Id. at 17–18.
183 Id. at 21.
184 Id. at 16.
177
178

2022] APPLICATION OF STEP TRANSACTION DOCTRINE 357
to decide the issue. It was considerably hampered by the Service’s
position to acquiesce to the Taxpayer’s assertion that the ONI merger counted in meeting the section 351 control requirement.185
The Service should not have placed minimizing the taxpayer’s
amortization deductions over attaining the right result.186
If a sole transferor, in a purported section 351 transaction, received seventy percent of the transferee’s shares, even if
from a corporate law standpoint her ability to control the company were not any less than had she owned eighty percent, a
court would undoubtedly hold that section 351 was not met.187
Tax lawyer and prolific commentator Jack Cummings wrote that
a “general principle of the federal income tax [is] that the taxpayer is [generally] stuck with its chosen form and its tax consequences.”188 While the ONI merger was certainly not as clear cut
as seventy percent control not satisfying section 368(c),189 the
Tax Court’s analysis raised the distinct possibility that this too
would fail the requisites of the statute if the court had been given
the unfettered opportunity to freely reach a judgment.190
II.THE ROLE OF THE STEP TRANSACTION DOCTRINE WITH
RESPECT TO POST TRANSFER SHARE DISPOSITIONS IN A
PURPORTED SECTION 351 TRANSACTION
A. The Step Transaction in General
The judicially developed step transaction doctrine “requires
that the interrelated steps of an integrated transaction be analyzed as a whole rather than treated separately.”191 Furthermore,
“if a larger transaction is considered to exist the doctrine normally requires the separate transactional steps to be collapsed
into—or recast as—an alternative but economically equivalent
transaction involving, if not a single step, then presumably fewer

Id. at 17.
186 Complex Media, Inc. v. Comm’r, 121 T.C.M. (CCH) 1089, 102 (2021).
187 See Lipton & King, supra note 29, at 16.
188 Jasper L. Cummings, Jr., Section 351 Loss of Control, 169 TAX NOTES
FED. 949, 950 (Nov. 9, 2020).
189 Complex Media, Inc., 121 T.C.M. (CCH) at 5–6.
190 Id. at 34 n.14.
191 BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 77, ¶ 4.3.5.
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steps.”192 It has been said to apply, “whenever two or more purported transactions, independent in form are deemed to be so
dependent upon each other in substance that they are viewed as
elements of one transaction.”193
The doctrine is often utilized by the courts, and the Service,
“to better reflect the economic reality of the taxpayer’s actions.”194
On occasion, such as in the Complex Media decision, discussed
above, the taxpayer has successfully asserted its applicability.195
It has been utilized frequently “to protect the underlying purpose of statutory provisions.”196 It is in this context, in particular
its use with respect to determining if the control requirement of
section 351 has been met, that this Article mainly focuses.197
The Supreme Court, over eighty years ago, stated that “a
given result at the end of a straight path is not made a different
result because reached by following a devious path.”198 The Tax
Court described this function of the canon as follows:

See Bowen, supra note 11, at 723.
193 See Howard J. Rothman et al., Transfers to Controlled Corporations,
758-3rd TAX MGMT. PORT. (BNA) ¶ III.F.2.
194 Jonathan D. Grossberg, Attacking Tax Shelters: Galloping Toward a Better Step Transaction Doctrine, 78 LA. L. REV. 369, 369 (2018).
195 Complex Media, Inc., 121 T.C.M. (CCH) at 74.
196 See Grossberg, supra note 194, at 374 (footnote omitted).
197 Id. at 375.
198 Minn. Tea Co. v. Helvering, 302 U.S. 609, 613 (1938). The Tenth Circuit observed in Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc. v. United States, 927
F.2d 1517, 1522 (10th Cir. 1991) that:
The step transaction principle derives from the classic tax case
Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 79 L. Ed. 596, 55 S. Ct. 266
(1935), and its progeny. In Gregory, the Supreme Court’s analysis of the tax effect of a transaction involved ‘putting aside ... the
question of motive in respect of taxation altogether, and fixing
the character of the proceeding by what actually occurred ....’
Id. at 469. The analysis revealed a transactional step which the
Court characterized as ‘an operation having no business or corporate purpose—a mere device which put on the form of a corporate reorganization as a disguise for concealing its real character,’
id., and as ‘an elaborate and devious form of conveyance masquerading as a corporate reorganization, and nothing else.’ Id.
at 470. The Court declined to ‘exalt artifice above reality’ and
affirmed the appellate court’s holding that there had been no
reorganization in the meaning of the statute.
192
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The step transaction doctrine generally applies in cases where
a taxpayer seeks to get from point A to point D and does so
stopping in between at points B and C. The whole purpose of
the unnecessary stops is to achieve tax consequences differing
from those which a direct path from A to D would have produced. In such a situation, courts are not bound by the twisted
path taken by the taxpayer, and the intervening stops may be
disregarded or rearranged.199

The step transaction doctrine can also be used by the courts
to “change the order of such transaction or steps.”200 Generally,
however, the Service may not “generate events which never took
place just so an additional tax liability might be asserted.”201
This judicial canon, “like the ... codified economic substance
doctrine, began as a common law effort to avoid results that the
courts and the IRS viewed as inappropriate but that seemed to
be mandated by a literal application of the statute.”202 It “developed as part of the broader tax concept that substance should
prevail over form.”203
Three different tests of the canon have been applied by
the courts and the Service (discussed below) and its utilization
for both determining control under section 351, and in general,
has been, in certain instances, intellectually inconsistent.204 Besides the question as to which test or tests are to be utilized in
determining whether the step transaction doctrine is applicable,
the courts have also shown differing views as to whether the
focus should be on “if each step by itself or the whole transaction
has economic substance/business purpose.”205 There has also
been concern raised that section 7701(o) resulting from the 2010

Smith v. Comm’r, 78 T.C. 350, 389 (1982).
200 See William W. Chip, The Economic Substance Doctrine, 508-2nd TAX
MGMT. PORT. (BNA) ¶ III.D.2 (Bureau Nat’l Aff. 2021).
201 Grove v. Comm’r, 490 F.2d 241, 247–48 (2d Cir. 1973) (citing Sheppard
v. U.S., 361 F.2d 972, 978 (Ct. Cl. 1966)).
202 Philip J. Levine & Britt M. Haxton, ‘The End Result Test’ Revisited,
Part 1, 149 TAX NOTES 1259, 1260 (2015) (footnote omitted).
203 Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc., 927 F.2d at 1521 (citing Am. Potash
& Chem. Corp. v. United States, 399 F.2d 194, 207, 185 (Ct. Cl. 1968)).
204 See Grossberg, supra note 194, at 369.
205 Yoram Keinan, Rethinking the Role of the Judicial Step Transaction
Principle and a Proposal for Codification, 22 AKRON TAX J. 45, 49 (2007).
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codification of the economic substance doctrine206 may “exacerbate ... inconsistency within the step transaction doctrine.”207
Sometimes courts and the Service have aggressively applied the doctrine, consistent with the following comment from
Professors Boris T. Bittker and Lawrence Lokken, that the step
transaction doctrine “began as an interpretation of a detailed
statutory provision, but it has been a successful cultural imperialist, on which the sun never sets. Its control is especially pronounced in the corporate-shareholder area.”208 In other instances,
however the courts have shown considerable reticence.209

Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111152, § 1409, 124 Stat. 1029, 1067–70.
207 Philip Sancilio, Note: Clarifying (or is it Codifying?) The “Notably Abstruse”:
Step Transactions, Economic Substance, and the Tax Code, 113 COLUM. L.
REV. 138, 140 (2013). Sancilio indicated that:
As wholly judicial creations and functional equivalents, the economic substance and step transaction doctrines generated many
varied, overlapping, and frequently conflicting formulations.
The definition of the codified economic substance doctrine exacerbates inconsistency within the step transaction doctrine
by encompassing some, but not all, of the step transaction
doctrine’s formulations. Confusion, once mostly confined to judicial dicta, may now govern the application of a statutory
framework and the imposition of statutory penalties. Resolving this newly significant inconsistency requires clarifying the
interaction and relationship between the two doctrines.
Id. (footnote omitted). Sancilo’s recommendation is:
that the economic substance doctrine should come before the
step transaction doctrine; courts must try to apply the codified
economic substance doctrine before turning to the step transaction doctrine. Practically, this means that application of the
step transaction doctrine requires first finding that the challenged transactions had both economic substance and a business
purpose. This condition severely constricts the step transaction doctrine’s availability while also clarifying and focusing
its function. Thus formulated, the step transaction doctrine
acts as a backstop. The doctrine catches cases in which a series
of transactions, each of which has some economic substance
and a business purpose and would be respected standing alone,
combine to generate an unacceptable result.
Id. at 178–79 (footnotes omitted).
208 See BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 77, ¶ 4.3.5 (footnotes omitted).
209 See Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc. v. United States, 927 F.2d 1517,
1524–25 (10th Cir. 1991); Esmark, Inc. v. Comm’r, 90 T.C. 171, 196–97 (1988).
206
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The dissimilarity of use of the doctrine by the courts can
be illustrated by briefly examining two decisions where the courts
differed as to the doctrine’s invocation. In Esmark, Inc. v. Commissioner, the taxpayer designed a plan for the disposition of its
Vickers energy business that avoided capital gain on the subsidiary’s built-in gain.210 The acquiror, Mobil Oil Corp., was required to
participate in “a ‘tender offer/redemption’ format,”211 wherein Mobil
Oil first bought shares in Esmark that were redeemed for the
Vickers shares.212 The transaction was designed to take advantage
of section 311,213 which then did not tax a distributing corporation on the excess of the fair market value of the property distributed over the corporation’s basis in the property before changes
made by the Tax Reform Act of 1986 became effective.214 The Tax
Court indicated that “Mobil was willing to accommodate petitioner’s tax planning by agreeing to the tender offer/redemption
if Mobil received assurances that the tender offer format would
not cost Mobil any more than its bid and would not expose Mobil
to additional liabilities or costs.”215 Among the arguments made
by the Service and rejected by the Tax Court was that the step
transaction doctrine was applicable.216 The Tax Court reasoned that
utilization of the step transaction doctrine was improper because
the Service “propose[d] to recharacterize the tender offer/redemption
as a sale of the Vickers shares to Mobil followed by a self-tender.
This recharacterization does not simply combine steps; it invents
new ones.”217
In comparison to Esmark, in Associated Wholesale Grocers,
Inc. v. United States the court thwarted a taxpayer's attempt to
recognize a built-in loss in one of its subsidiaries with a transaction that divested the subsidiary's almost entire business was
immediately reacquired by the taxpayer pursuant to a preexisting plan with the buyer.218 In disallowing the loss pursuant to

Esmark, Inc., 90 T.C. at 171.
Id. at 175.
212 Id.
213 Id. at 176.
214 Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 211, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986).
215 Esmark, Inc., 90 T.C. at 176.
216 Id. at 196–97.
217 Id. at 196.
218 927 F.2d 1517, 1518, 1530 (10th Cir. 1991).
210
211
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the step transaction doctrine, the Tenth Circuit stated that “[t]he
degree of interconnectedness seen here is sufficient under the
law to require us to ignore the form of these steps if that form
belies the substance of the transaction as a whole.”219
The courts have applied three different tests for determining
if employment of the step transaction doctrine is appropriate: (1)
the “binding commitment” test; (2) the “end result” test; and (3)
the “mutual interdependence” test (also referred to as simply “interdependence” test).220 The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
observed that “[m]ore than one test might be appropriate under
any given set of circumstances; however, the circumstances need
only satisfy one of the tests in order for the step transaction doctrine to operate.”221 Some courts have, however, determined that
“more than one of the alternative tests should be satisfied in
determining whether the steps ought to be collapsed under the
step transaction doctrine.”222 Commentators have noted that “[n]o
one test is universally accepted, and historically, step transaction doctrine analysis has depended on the particular facts and
circumstances, making it difficult to predict the outcome in
many cases.”223 Tax lawyer Stephen S. Bowen opined that “[t]he
existence of three step transaction tests implies greater conceptual clarity and distinctiveness than, in fact, exists.”224
The most rigid test, and the one least often utilized,225 is
the binding commitment test, which requires that the “taxpayer
[be] contractually bound to complete all steps when the first in a
series of transactions was undertaken.”226 Another way to characterize this test is that “[i]f there were a moment in the series of
the transactions during which the parties were not under a binding
obligation, the steps cannot be collapsed under this test.”227 It

Id. at 1528.
220 See, e.g., True v. United States, 190 F.3d 1165, 1174–75 (10th Cir. 1999);
Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc. v. United States, 927 F.2d 1517, 1522 (10th
Cir. 1991).
221 True, 190 F.3d at 1175 (citing Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc., 927
F.2d at 1527–28).
222 See Chip, supra note 200, ¶ III.D.3 (footnote omitted).
223 See Levine & Haxton, supra note 202, at 1261.
224 See Bowen, supra note 11, at 722–23.
225 See Chip, supra note 200, ¶ III.D.3.a (footnote omitted).
226 See BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 77, ¶ 4.3.5.
227 See Chip, supra note 200, ¶ III.D.3.a (footnote omitted).
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was first enunciated by the Supreme Court in Commissioner v.
Gordon.228 There, the Court stated that “if one transaction is to
be characterized as a ‘first step’ there must be a binding commitment to take the later steps.”229 According to the Tax Court,
“[t]he purpose of the binding commitment test is to promote certainty in tax planning; it is the most rigorous limitation of the step
transaction doctrine. It is seldom used and is applicable only
where a substantial period of time has passed between the steps
that are subject to scrutiny.”230 It has been suggested that the
test is appropriate for taxpayers who are seeking to apply the
step transaction doctrine.231
Another test the courts have employed is the end result
test, which appears to be the test used most often.232 Under this
methodology, “purportedly separate transactions will be amalgamated into a single transaction when it appears that they were
really component parts of a single transaction intended from the
outset to be taken for the purpose of reaching the ultimate result.”233 The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals explained that “[u]nder
this test, if we find the series of closely related steps in a transaction are merely the means to reach a particular result, we will
not separate those steps, but instead treat them as a single
transaction.”234 The court further observed that “[t]he taxpayer’s

391 U.S. 83, 96 (1968).
229 Id.
230 Andantech LLC v. Comm’r, 83 T.C.M. 1476, 1504 (2002), aff’d 331 F.3d
972 (D.C. Cir. 2003). Professor Jensen suggested that the reason the binding
commitment test has been utilized when there is a significant time span between
steps is that “there is a practical need to determine the resulting tax consequences
prior to the final step, so the transaction can properly be reported on the taxpayer’s annual return.” See Jensen, supra note 1, at 360 (footnote omitted).
231 See Grossberg, supra note 194, at 398 (“In other words, in the view of
some courts and scholars, the IRS is permitted to assert the step transaction
doctrine to recharacterize a transaction on the basis of any test, but if the taxpayer
wants to assert the step transaction doctrine to characterize a series of steps it
took as a single transaction, ostensibly the taxpayer only may use the binding commitment test as the basis for its assertion.” Id. at 398–99 (footnote omitted)).
232 See Chip, supra note 200, ¶ III.D.3.b (citing Sec. Indus. Ins. Co. v. U.S.,
702 F.2d 1234, 1244 (5th Cir. 1983)).
233 Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc. v. United States, 927 F.2d 1517,
1523 (quoting King Enters., Inc. v. U.S., 418 F.2d 511, 516 (Cl. Ct. 1969)).
234 True v. United States, 190 F.3d 1165, 1175 (citing Kanawha Gas &
Utils. Co. v. Comm’r, 214 F.2d 685, 691 (5th Cir. 1954)).
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subjective intent is especially relevant under this test because it
allows us to determine whether the taxpayer directed a series of
transactions to an intended purpose.”235 In a footnote, the Tenth
Circuit in True v. United States explained what it meant with
respect to taxpayer intent for this purpose:
We emphasize that under the end result test, our focus is not
on the legitimacy of the intended result, but instead on whether
the taxpayer undertook multiple steps to achieve a particular
result. Thus, if a taxpayer engages in a series of steps that
achieve a particular result, he cannot request independent tax
recognition of the individual steps unless he shows that at the
time he engaged in the individual step, its result was the intended end result in and of itself. If this is not what the taxpayer intended, then we collapse the series of steps and only
give tax consideration to the intended end result.236

The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Security Industrial
Insurance Co. v. United States, described its application of the end
result as follows:
In this case we are faced with a dizzying array of legal maneuvers: OIC’s purchases of Southern’s and Standard’s stock,
the reinsurance agreements between Southern, Standard, and
Security, the transfers of Southern’s and Security’s assets through
OIC to Security, and, finally, the liquidations of Southern and
Security under state law. Yet all these machinations cannot
disguise the fact that the intended result of each series of transactions was the acquisition of Southern’s and Standard’s assets
by Security. Security and OIC left a clear and well-documented
paper trail to this effect. Security’s game plans for acquiring
Southern and Standard were identical to the strategy it had
pursued for over twenty years: liquidate the rival company
and gobble up the assets. Such a plan of acquisition amounts
to nothing more than a taxable cash purchase by Security of
Southern’s and Standard’s assets .... Thus these transactions
must be viewed in their entireties under the “end result” test
of the step transaction doctrine.237


Id. (citing Brown v. U.S., 782 F.2d 559, 563 (6th Cir. 1986)).
236 Id. at 1175 n.9.
237 702 F.2d 1234, 1246 (5th Cir. 1983) (footnote omitted). The court also
found there that the step transaction doctrine applied under the third test,
i.e., the mutual interdependence test. Id. at 1246–47.
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The third test utilized by the courts in determining whether
it is proper to apply the step transaction is the mutual interdependence test.238 The Tax Court stated that “[t]he test is, were
the steps taken so interdependent that the legal relations created
by one transaction would have been fruitless without a completion of the series.”239 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Security Industrial Insurance Co. v. United States added that “[t]he
‘interdependence’ test for applying step transaction analysis
asks whether the individual steps in a series had independent
significance or whether they had meaning only as part of the
larger transaction. This test concentrates on the relationship between the steps, rather than on their ‘end result.’”240 It has been
referred to as a “middle version of the step transaction jurisprudence.”241 The Fifth Circuit emphasized that under the mutual
interdependence test “we examine this tandem of transactional
totalities to determine whether each step had a reasoned economic justification standing alone.”242 The Tax Court in Andantech L.L.C. v. Commissioner noted that under this approach “it is
useful to compare the transactions in question with those usually
expected to occur in otherwise bona fide business settings.”243
While certainly not conclusive, absent a binding commitment, courts tend to collapse steps more readily when the period
between them is relatively short.244 William Chip contrasted the
See Chip, supra note 200, ¶ III.D.3.
Manhattan Bldg. Co. v. Comm’r, 27 T.C. 1032, 1042 (1957) acq. 1957-2
C.B.5 (citing Am. Bantam Car Co. v. Comm’r, 11 T.C. 397 (1948)).
240 702 F.2d at 1246–47 (citing McDonald’s Rests. v. Comm’r, 688 F.2d
520, 524 (7th Cir. 1982)).
241 See Levine & Haxton, supra note 202, at 1261.
242 Sec. Indus. Ins. Co., 702 F.2d at 1247.
243 83 T.C.M. 1476, 1505 (2002).
244 See BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 77, ¶ 4.3.5. Bittker & Lokken observed that “while simultaneity is often the best evidence of interdependence,
the step transaction doctrine has been applied to events separated by as much as
five years and, on other facts, held inapplicable to events occurring within a
period of 30 minutes.” Id. Noting “[c]ompare Douglas v. CIR, 37 BTA 1122 (1938)
(acq.) (five-year delay in consummating corporate reorganization resulting
from nonassignability of contracts and disputed claims) with Henricksen v.
Braicks, 137 F.2d 632 (9th Cir. 1943) (liquidation treated as independent of
transfer of assets to new corporation 30 minutes later).” Id. at n.93.
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results in Litton Industries v. Commissioner245 with that of Waterman Steamship Corp. v. Commissioner,246 both involving distributions made by a target corporation in conjunction with its sale,
where the selling shareholder asserted it was entitled to dividend
treatment.247 While the taxpayer prevailed in the former case,248
in Waterman Steamship the payment was treated as consideration
for the target under circumstances where “all of the steps took
place within one hour and a half.”249
An example of when the short time between steps led to
combining steps in the context of section 351 is D’Angelo Associates,
Inc. v. Commissioner.250 There, the Service successfully asserted
section 351 should apply to a transaction wherein a dentist had
established the company with its shares issued to his wife and minor children for $15,000 in cash.251 A few days after its incorporation, the dentist and his wife transferred property formally
designated as a sale to the company to be leased for use in his
dental practice in exchange for, among other things, a $15,000
demand note.252 In rejecting the company’s contention that depreciation of the property should be based on sale treatment, the
Tax Court emphasized the transfer was close in time to taxpayer’s organization:
Petitioner has failed to convince us that a sale took place. The
events significant to the creation of petitioner occurred almost
simultaneously. The formation of petitioner, the transfer of
$15,000 cash to petitioner for the issuance of 60 shares of stock,
and the transfer of the rental property to petitioner for the return of the $15,000 in cash and the notes all occurred within
an interval of less than 10 days. The evidence demonstrates
that these steps were integral parts of a plan designed by Dr.
D’Angelo to transfer the assets used primarily in his dental
practice from individual to corporate ownership.253


See 89 T.C. 1086, 1101 (1987).
246 See 430 F.2d 1185, 1185–86 (5th Cir. 1970).
247 Litton Indus., 89 T.C. at 1086, 1101; Waterman Steamship Corp., 430
F.2d at 1185–86.
248 Litton Indus., 89 T.C. at 1089, 1100–01.
249 See Chip, supra note 200, ¶ III.D.4.
250 70 T.C. 121, 136 (1978).
251 Id. at 123 (citation omitted).
252 Id.
253 Id. at 129–30.
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Professor Ronald Jensen lamented that “[t]he step transaction doctrine is ... a mixture of inconsistency and ambiguity.
Three different tests exist for determining its applicability, but
the courts have articulated no standard for determining which test
should be applied.”254 Furthermore, Professor Jensen commented
that “[e]ven after the appropriate test is chosen, the test can be
applied restrictively or expansively, but the courts have not coherently or persuasively explained whether a narrow or broad
application is appropriate.”255 He is one of many commentators
who have voiced frustration with the canon’s application.256
Professor Jensen found that, in particular, the “confusion
over the proper test for applying the step transaction is itself a
source of the inconsistency in cases arising under section 351.”257
A major core of this Article is the application of the step transaction doctrine to determine whether control has been met under
section 351 for post contribution share dispositions by the transferor that are connected with the original contribution.258
B. The Application of the Step Transaction Doctrine to Determine
Whether Control Has Been Met Under Section 351 for Post
Contribution Share Dispositions Connected with the
Original Contribution
A fundamental requirement for section 351 to pertain is that
the transferor or transferors of property to the corporation are in
control of that corporation “immediately after the exchange.”259
Professors Boris T. Bittker & James S. Eustice observed in their

See Jensen, supra note 1, at 366.
Id. at 366–67.
256 See, e.g., Joshua D. Rosenberg, Tax Avoidance and Income Measurement,
87 MICH. L. REV. 365, 413–17 (1988); see Bowen, supra note 11, at 722; Grossberg,
supra note 194, at 369, 436.
257 See Jensen, supra note 1, at 360.
258 See discussion infra Section II.B.
259 26 U.S.C. § 351(a). “Control” is defined as follows:
For purposes of part I (other than section 304), part II, this part,
and part V, the term ‘control’ means the ownership of stock
possessing at least 80 percent of the total combined voting
power of all classes of stock entitled to vote and at least 80
percent of the total number of shares of all other classes of
stock of the corporation.
26 U.S.C. § 368(c).
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seminal treatise, Federal Income Taxation of Corporations & Shareholders, that “[l]itigation abounds over [this] requirement ... [and
this] is one principal application of the so-called ‘step transaction
doctrine.’”260 They pointed out that while:
[t]he doctrine arises in connection with the control requirement
comes up in a variety of contexts, but a principal problem is
whether the statute is satisfied if the transferors own 80 percent
or more of the stock momentarily, but then [their ownership]
drops below that benchmark because they sell or give away some
of their stock (e.g., to children) or because the corporation issues additional shares to employees, [investors, or others].261

A good example of where a court has utilized the step
transaction to deny section 351 treatment, and did so correctly,
is Intermountain Lumber Co. v. Commissioner.262 There, just as
with D’Angelo Associates, the transferee taxpayer was the party
that argued section 351 had not applied, in order to maximize its
inside basis and thus its cost recovery deductions.263
Some of the more relevant facts of Intermountain Lumber
Co. were as follows. After a fire at an existing sawmill owned by
Mr. Dee Shook, he and Mr. Milo Wilson, who was both a customer and co-owner with Shook of a separate lumber finishing
plant, wanted to replace it with a larger facility.264 This would
enable their finishing plant to operate at full capacity.265 Shook
could not afford the new facility on his own so he “induced Wilson
to personally coguarantee [sic] a $200,000 loan to provide financing. In return, Wilson insisted upon an equal voice in rebuilding
the sawmill and an opportunity to become an equal shareholder
with Shook in the new sawmill.”266
In May 1964, articles of incorporation for S & W Sawmill,
Inc. (S&W) were executed, with “S & W ... derived from the names
Shook and Wilson.”267 At the initial shareholders meeting, “Mr.

See BORIS T. BITTKER & JAMES S. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION
OF CORPORATIONS & SHAREHOLDERS ¶ 3.09[2] (7th ed. 2015, updated July 2021).
261 Id. (footnote omitted).
262 65 T.C. 1025, 1025, 1033–34 (1976).
263 Id.
264 Id. at 1026.
265 Id.
266 Id.
267 Id.
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Shook informed the meeting that a separate agreement was being
prepared between he and Mr. Wilson providing for the sale of
one-half of his stock to Mr. Wilson.”268 In July 1964, Shook transferred his sawmill site and equipment in return for 364 shares in
S&W, which constituted all the company’s shares except for 4
incorporation shares.269 At the same time, Shook and Wilson entered into an agreement with Wilson for the purchase of 182 shares
of S&W stock from Shook at $500 a share, with prescribed interest for deferred payment, with these shares put in escrow.270
Simultaneously, Shook executed an irrevocable proxy entitling
Wilson to the right to vote his shares for approximately the next
14 months.271 In August 1964, “S & W borrowed $200,000, in
part upon the personal guarantees of Shook, Wilson, and their
wives. The loan agreement referred to Shook and Wilson as ‘the
principal officers and stockholders’ of S & W.”272 S & W also agreed
at that time “to insure the lives of Shook and Wilson for $100,000
each.”273 In 1967, when S&W was bought by Intermountain
Lumber Co., Wilson still owed Shook “$91,000 for 182 shares of
S & W ... stock in escrow.”274
The Tax Court, in holding that section 351 was not satisfied, framed the issue as whether, at the time of the transfer of
the property to S & W, Shook was in “control” of the company.
That is, did “Shook alone own ... the requisite percentage of shares
for control?275 The court found that:
Shook and Wilson intended to consummate a sale of the S &
W stock, that they never doubted that the sale would be completed, that the sale was an integral part of the incorporation
transaction, and that they considered themselves to be coowners
[sic] of S & W upon execution of the stock purchase agreement
in 1964.276


Id.
269 Id. at 1027.
270 Id. at 1027–28.
271 Id. at 1028.
272 Id.
273 Id.
274 Id. at 1029.
275 Id. at 1031.
276 Id. at 1032.
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Later in the opinion, the Tax Court reiterated its findings
“that Shook, as part of the same transaction by which the shares
were acquired (indeed, the agreement for sale was executed before the sawmill was deeded to S & W), had relinquished when
he acquired those shares the legal right to determine whether to
keep them.”277 He “was under an obligation, upon receipt of the
shares, to transfer the stock as he received Wilson’s principal
payments .... Shook, therefore did not own ... the requisite percentage of stock immediately after the exchange to control the
corporation.”278 He lacked the requisite “freedom of action” with
respect to 182 shares that were contractually assigned to Wilson.279
The Tax Court explained that its holding was consistent
with the purpose of section 351:
We note also that the basic premise of section 351 is to avoid
recognition of gain or loss resulting from transfer of property
to a corporation which works a change of form only .... Accordingly, if the transferor sells his stock as part of the same transaction, the transaction is taxable because there has been more
than a mere change in form.280

Another Tax Court step transaction decision regarding this
subject was Manhattan Building Co. v. Commissioner, where the
transferee taxpayer was the party claiming the transfer should
be taxable because the control requirement was not met.281 The
case dealt with a predecessor to section 351 and whether the taxpayer making the assignment had the requisite control.282 In 1922,
the original transferor, Mr. Clement O. Miniger had conveyed
property to Electric Auto-Lite Company in return for 250,000
shares of common stock and bonds.283 If one looked no further,

Id. at 1033.
Id.
279 Id. at 1031; The Tax Court in Complex Media quoted this phrase in its
analysis. Complex Media, Inc. v. Comm’r, 121 T.C.M. (CCH) 1089, 23 (2021).
280 Intermountain Lumber Co., 65 T.C. at 1033–34. Professor Jensen argued
that this premise is specious. See Jensen, supra note 1, at 395–96. The Tax
Court also noted that that the Service “abandoned ... [its] contention that
Wilson was a transferor of property and therefore a person to also be counted
for control under section 351.” Intermountain Lumber Co., 65 T.C. at 1031.
281 Manhattan Bldg. Co. v. Comm’r, 27 T.C. 1032, 1042 (1957).
282 Id.
283 Id. at 1036–37.
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the transfer would have met the requirements of the predecessor
to section 351.284 The Tax Court said, however, that the control
requirement was not satisfied because “Miniger was under a
binding contract to deliver the bonds and 75,000 shares of stock
[in Electric Auto-Lite Company] to the underwriters and to return 49,000 shares to the corporation.”285
The Tax Court observed, in its analysis of whether control
was met, that one looks to “whether the transfer of assets to
Auto-Lite in exchange for its stock and bonds and the transfer of
stock and bonds to the underwriters were mutually interdependent
transactions.”286 The test for being mutually interdependent “is,
were the steps taken so interdependent that the legal relations
created by one transaction would have been fruitless without a
completion of the series.”287 In this case, the requisite interdependence existed because “Miniger could not have completed the
purchase of the assets without the cash supplied by the underwriters and could not have had the cash except in exchange for
the bonds and stock and could not have secured the bonds and
stock except for the assets.”288 As discussed further below, the
Treasury and IRS now provide in the regulations289 essentially
that the buyer of the shares from the underwriter in a “qualified
underwriting transaction” is deemed to be a co-transferor and
the underwriter ignored, thus eliminating the control issue of share
dispositions made to an underwriter in circumstances covered by
the regulation.290
A different result from Manhattan Building was reached
in an earlier underwriting case, which was cited and distinguished
in Manhattan Building: American Bantam Car Co. v. Commissioner.291 The case also involved a predecessor to section 351 and
the issue of whether the transferor met the necessary control

Id. at 1041.
Id. at 1042.
286 Id.
287 Id. The Tax Court cited Am. Bantam Car Co. v. Comm’r for this language.
11 T.C. 397, 405 (1948).
288 Manhattan Bldg. Co., 29 T.C. at 1042.
289 See 26 C.F.R. § 1.351-1(a)(3)(i) (1999).
290 Id.
291 Compare Manhattan Bldg. Co., 27 T.C. at 1042, with Am. Bantam Car
Co. v. Comm’r, 11 T.C. 397, 397 (1948).
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requirement.292 As with Manhattan Building, the taxpayer transferee was again arguing that it was entitled to fair market value
basis on the transfer because gain should have been recognized
on the initial contribution.293 Here, however, the taxpayer was
unsuccessful, with the court holding that the original transfer
met the control requirements for tax-free treatment.294
In that case, a group of individuals, referred to as “the associates,” transferred certain properties, subject to liabilities, for
300,000 shares of the American Bantam Car Co.’s common stock.295
As part of the organizing plan “90,000 shares of petitioner’s preference stock would be offered to the public at $10 a share.”296 Furthermore, “the underwriters of such issue of preferred stock were
to receive from the associates ... as further compensation for their
services as underwriters, certain amounts of the common stock
issued to the associates.”297 Additionally, “[a]ll the interested
parties orally agreed to the substance of this plan prior to ... [the
transfer to American Bantam] though there was no formal written contract between the parties at this time.”298
A few days after the June 3, 1936 assignment, contracts
were entered into between the petitioner and the underwriter as
well as between the associates and the underwriter.299 With respect to the latter, “[i]n substance the associates agreed to deliver
[in trust] to the Butler County National Bank & Trust Co. of Butler,
Pennsylvania, certificates for 100,000 shares of common stock
endorsed in blank for transfer to the underwriters.”300 The underwriter’s right to receive these shares was tied to its sale of
the preference shares over a period of time.301
The Tax Court noted that “[d]uring the year 1936 only
14,757 shares of the preferred stock was [sic] sold by the underwriters.”302 There was a change in underwriters and “[b]etween

Am. Bantam Car Co., 11 T.C. at 402–03.
Id.
294 Id. at 410.
295 Id. at 399.
296 Id.
297 Id.
298 Id.
299 Id. at 400–01.
300 Id. at 401.
301 Id.
302 Id.
292
293
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October 1936 and October 1937 Grant [the new underwriter] sold
83,618 shares of convertible preferred stock to the public.”303
In determining that the control requirement was satisfied, the Tax Court noted that “[p]rima facie, when the various
steps taken to organize the new corporation and transfer assets
to it are considered separately, the associates did have ‘control’ of
the petitioner immediately after the exchange within the statutory definition of the word.”304 The court reasoned that “from
June 3 to June 8, 1936, they owned 100 per cent [sic] of all the
issued stock, and from June 8, 1936, until October 1937 they owned
stock possessing at least 80 per cent of the total combined voting
power of all classes of stock.”305 The court ignored the pre-assignment plan, stating that “[o]n June 3, 1936, the associates were
issued absolutely and unconditionally 300,000 shares of no par
common stock. The resolution of the board of directors of petitioner accepting the associates’ offer of the Austin assets attached
no strings whatsoever to the issuance of the stock to them.”306
As to the agreements with the underwriter occurring a few
days after the property assignments, the Tax Court stated:
[o]n June 8 no other common stock had been issued, and a contract regarding possible future assignment of those 300,000
shares already issued was not entered into before that date.
No preferred stock had been issued on June 3, nor was a contract for its sale provided until June 8.307

According to the court, “[t]he statutory words ‘immediately
after the exchange’ require control for no longer period; in fact,
momentary control is sufficient.”308 The Tax Court said not only
did the associates have control from June 3 to June 8, even after
the agreement with the underwriter “the ownership of the
300,000 shares remained in the associates until such sales were
completed.”309 Furthermore, even on “August 16, 1936, [when]
the associates deposited all their shares in escrow with the Butler

Id.
304 Id. at 404.
305 Id.
306 Id.
307 Id.
308 Id.
309 Id.
303
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County National Bank & Trust Co. ... they only surrendered possession by the terms of their agreement with the bank and retained
all other attributes of ownership.”310
In the court’s judgment, despite the pre-assignment oral
plan, “[t]he standard required by the courts to enable them to say
that a series of steps are interdependent and thus should be viewed
as a single transaction do not exist here.”311 The court was of the
opinion that “[t]he understanding with the underwriters for disposing of the preferred stock, however important, was not a sine
qua non in the general plan, without which no other step would
have been taken.”312 That is, “[w]hile the incorporation and exchange of assets would have been purposeless one without the
other, ... both would have been carried out even though the contemplated method of marketing the preferred stock might fail.”313
The decision reached in American Bantam Car was certainly sensible, although the court’s dicta about “momentary control
is sufficient,” while shared by some other courts discussed below,314
and admittedly consistent with the “immediately after” language
in section 351(a),315 would serve to nullify any role for the step
transaction in determining control for section 351 purposes.316
As discussed below, this is not sound policy.317 The Treasury/IRS
regulatory decision to ignore the underwriter and treat the buyer
as a co-transferor in “a qualified underwriting transaction”318

Am. Bantam Car Co. v. Comm’r, 11 T.C. 397, 404 (1948).
Id. at 406.
312 Id. (emphasis added).
313 Id. at 406–07.
314 Id. at 404.
315 I.R.C. § 351(a).
316 See Am. Bantam Car Co., 11 T.C. at 405.
317 See infra notes 406–49 and accompanying text.
318 26 C.F.R. § 1.35101(a)(3)(i). With respect to the impact on control from
underwriting transferee shares, 26 C.F.R. § 1.351-1(a)(3)(i) provides that:
For the purpose of section 351, if a person acquires stock of a
corporation from an underwriter in exchange for cash in a qualified underwriting transaction, the person who acquires stock
from the underwriter is treated as transferring cash directly
to the corporation in exchange for stock of the corporation and
the underwriter is disregarded. A qualified underwriting transaction is a transaction in which a corporation issues stock for
cash in an underwriting in which either the underwriter is an
agent of the corporation or the underwriter’s ownership of the
stock is transitory.
310
311



2022] APPLICATION OF STEP TRANSACTION DOCTRINE 375
eliminates the loss of control issue, and thus removes a barrier
to public equity financing.319 This is certainly practical and (according to at least one commentary) conceptually correct.320 Professor Jensen, however, disputes the logic for special treatment
for underwriting transactions.321
Suppose that a taxpayer at the time he transferred his sole
proprietorship business to a newly incorporated entity (Newco)
for all its shares, was under a binding obligation to sell half of
his Newco shares to a non-underwriter. Should this be treated

Id. Prior to being made obsolete by the aforementioned regulation, Rev. Rul.
78-294, distinguished between firm commitment and best-efforts underwriters in analyzing the application of the section 351 control requirement. Rev.
Rule 78-294, 1798-2 C.B. 141, obsoleted by T.D. 8665, 61 Fed. Reg. 19188 (May 1,
1996). A firm commitment underwriter was someone who received shares in
the transferee for cash as part of the asset transfer, intends to sell the shares
received, but if unsuccessful was required to retain the shares. Under Rev.
Rul. 78-294, the firm commitment underwriter was considered to be a transferor, i.e., part of the original control group. Id. The Service also determined
in Rev. Rul. 78-294 that the firm commitment underwriter’s sale of the shares
did not undermine the original transfer, satisfying the section 351 control requirement. Id. In the other situation covered by Rev. Rul. 78-294, that of a
best-efforts underwriter, the Service characterized the underwriter as an agent of
the transferee and unlike the firm commitment underwriter, not part of the
control group. Id. It was an agent of the transferor. Id. Under the facts of the
ruling, the public shareholders who bought the shares from the best-efforts
underwriter were considered to be part of the control group. Id.
319 See David R. Tillinghast & Denise G. Paully, The Effect of the Collateral
Issuance of Stock or Securities on the “Control” Requirement of Section 351, 37
TAX L. REV. 251, 264 (1982).
320 Id. at 264–65. Written before the promulgation of the section 351 underwriting regulation, Reg. § 1.351-1(a)(3)(I), the authors distinguished a thirdparty sale by the transferor with the underwriting process as follows:
In the usual third-party transfer case, the initial transferor
exchanges property for stock and then receives cash for that
stock from a third party. In the underwriting transaction, however,
the underwriter merely acts as a conduit for stock in one direction and cash in the other. The substance of the transaction is a
cash payment by the investor to the corporation (reduced, of
course, by the underwriter’s spread, dealer’s commission, and so
forth) in exchange for its stock. There is no bail-out and no
change of position comparable to those occurring in the thirdparty transfer cases. Therefore, the investor can appropriately
be regarded as a section 351 transferor even when the public offering is integrated with the incorporation transaction.
Id. at 264.
321 See Jensen, supra note 1, at 357–58.
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as a valid section 351 transaction? What if there was no legal
commitment to sell half his Newco shares, but the transfer of
the business to Newco was predicated on his sale of half of the
Newco shares that he received? Assume he in fact did sell half of
the Newco shares a day after the property contribution. In both
circumstances, Professor Jensen would argue that the transfers
should be good section 351 transactions, nullifying any role for
the step transaction doctrine.322 As will be elaborated upon below, this Article argues that neither contribution should qualify
for nonrecognition.323
Before focusing on why Professor Jensen came to this conclusion, one needs to understand his generally apt dissatisfaction with some of the decisions and the Service’s positions in this
area. Professor Jensen’s article was critical regarding how the
Service and the courts have often addressed the application of
the step transaction doctrine in the section 351 context.324 As noted
in this Article’s introduction, he wrote that “[i]n their quest to
distinguish form from substance in section 351 cases, the courts
and the Service have created a patchwork of irreconcilable decisions, inexplicable on the basis of logic or policy and virtually
devoid of any explanatory or predictive value.”325 This, Professor
Jensen argued, has resulted in a “series of ad hoc decisions distinguishable only on the basis of their factual variations, with
little or no explanation as to why such factual variation justifies
a particular result.”326 He contended that “[t]his lack of a consistent rationale has made both prediction and rational development of the law virtually impossible.”327

See id. at 358–59.
See id. at 381.
324 See id. at 355–56.
325 Id.; see also supra note 6 and accompanying text.
326 Jensen, supra note 1, at 355–56.
327 Id. at 356. Professor Jensen asserted that:
The confusion and inconsistencies in section 351 cases described
above stem from a basic misunderstanding of the function of
the step transaction doctrine. Courts have viewed the doctrine
as an instrument for perceiving reality, that is, for determining what really took place. The courts typically employ the
doctrine to ascertain “what really happened,” and then apply
the relevant legal principles to the facts thus determined. This
approach misses the true nature of the step transaction doctrine.
Legal doctrines are not, and by their nature cannot be, devices
for determining reality. They do not add to our ability to discern
322
323
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Professor Jensen provided a hypothetical fact pattern wherein father F wants to incorporate his sole proprietorship and at
the same time gift seventy-five percent of the business to his son
S.328 F takes back seventy-five percent of the shares in Newco
and twenty-five percent are immediately given to S.329 In a variation of this hypothetical, he posits that as a matter of convenience S’s shares go directly from Newco to him.330 He compared
the result in these cases with those where F has a binding obligation to sell his shares to a third party, who is not an underwriter.331 He asked why these fact patterns should conceptually
have contrary results vis-a-vis control.332 He wrote:
The similarities between the binding obligation case and the
gift case would seemingly dictate the same result: the control
requirement was unsatisfied. F’s ownership of a controlling stock
interest was just as fleeting as was the transferor’s controlling
stock interest in the binding obligation case; arguably more so,
since F was never record owner of a controlling stock interest.
Certainly it was no more permanent. Further, in both cases, the
loss of control was predetermined and may be fairly characterized as part and parcel of the overall transaction. Nevertheless, the courts and the Service have with only rare exception
treated the gift cases as satisfying the control requirement.333

Focusing for a moment on his first gift hypothetical, the
distinction with a binding obligation is that the transferor retained “freedom of action.”334 Professor Jensen recognized this but
believed that “this purported distinction hardly justifies the differing tax treatments.”335 Among his arguments was the idea

the facts. Rather, legal doctrines, including the step transaction
doctrine, are means of determining legal consequences. A necessary corollary of this observation is that the proper scope
and limits of the doctrine must ultimately be grounded in the
policy the law seeks to implement.
Id. at 372 (footnotes omitted).
328 See id. at 356.
329 See id.
330 See id.
331 See id.
332 See id.
333 Id. (footnote omitted).
334 See, e.g., Intermountain Lumber Co. v. Comm’r, 65 T.C. 1025, 1031–32
(1976).
335 See Jensen, supra note 1, at 358.
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that “it is anomalous to make tax treatment turn on a person’s
technical legal rights which he or she has no intention of exercising when the point of the exercise is to tax the transaction on its
substance and not its form.”336 As to Professor Jensen’s hypothetical variation, wherein F never actually received the shares,
the failure to conform to the form of the statute should arguably
result in an invalid section 351 transaction,337 although there is
conflicting authority discussed below.338
Some of the relevant authorities addressing control when
there is a disposition of shares through a gift are as follows. In
Wilgard Realty Co., Inc v. Commissioner, the transferor to a newly
formed corporation, “intended when the transfer was made to
give away about three-fourths of the stock he received and did so
on the same day.”339 In holding that the control requirement was
met despite both the planned and effected divestiture of most of
the transferee stock at the time of the contribution, the Second
Circuit reasoned:
Though it was plainly enough Mr. Chamberlin’s [the transferor] intention to create the petitioner and to transfer his property to it for its stock and the assumption of his liability on
the two mortgages in order to provide him with stock to give
as he did to his relatives, he was under no obligation to make
the gift. There is neither claim nor proof that he was bound to
carry out his intention to give any of it away when he received
the stock or that he was not free at any time up to the very
moment he gave it away to change his mind and use it for any
lawful purpose .... In the absence of any restriction upon his
freedom of action after he acquired the stock, he had “immediately after the exchange” as much control of the petitioner
as if he had not before made up his mind to give away most of
his stock and with it consequently his control. And that is equally
true whether the transaction is viewed as a whole or as a series of separate steps.340

In Stanton v. United States, a case not involving section 351
but rather whether a transaction met the control requirements

Id. at 358–59.
Id. at 356.
338 Wilgard Realty Co. v. Comm’r, 127 F.2d 514, 515–16 (2d Cir. 1942),
cert. denied, 317 U.S. 655 (1942).
339 Id. at 515.
340 Id. at 516.
336
337
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for a section 368(a)(1)(D) reorganization, control was found to be
met where the transferor designated forty-nine percent of the
shares to go to his wife as a gift.341 In determining that the control requirement had been satisfied, despite the fact that fortynine percent of the shares went directly to transferor’s wife, the
court indicated “that at the time of the transfer of the operating
assets ... to the new enterprise Stanton had the absolute right to
designate who would receive all the stock.”342
In D’Angelo Associates, discussed above, in which the Service successfully argued section 351 applied, the Tax Court, like
in Stanton, held that the control requisite was met even though
shares were directly issued “in the names of their children.”343
The Tax Court held that “[t]he loss of control of petitioner resulting from the gift of stock does not preclude the application of
section 351(a), which requires that the transferors be in control
of the transferee corporation ‘immediately after the exchange.’”344
The court stated that “[t]his requirement is satisfied where, as
here, the transferors transfer by gift the stock they were entitled
to receive in exchange for the property they transferred to the
corporation, regardless of whether such disposition was planned
before or after acquiring control.”345 The court reasoned that “[t]he
issuance of the stock by petitioner to the D’Angelo children is
the direct consequence of ‘the absolute right’ of Dr. and Mrs.
D’Angelo to designate who would receive all of the stock.”346
Contrast the result in Stanton and D’Angelo Associates with
Fahs v. Florida Machine & Foundry Co.347 In Fahs, a “father
and son entered into an agreement whereby the son would eventually receive a one-half interest in the business, if he remained
with it and continued to operate the plant.”348 Three years later,
“[i]n pursuance of this agreement, the Florida Machine and

512 F.2d 13, 15, 17 (3d Cir. 1975).
Id. at 17.
343 See D’Angelo Assoc. v. Comm’r, 70 T.C. 121, 131–32 (1978); see also supra
notes 250–53 and accompanying text.
344 D’Angelo Assoc., 70 T.C. at 132.
345 Id.
346 Id.
347 Compare Fahs v. Fla. Mach. & Foundry Co., 168 F.2d 957, 959 (5th Cir.
1948), with Stanton, 512 F.2d at 18, and D’Angelo Assoc., 70 T.C. at 132–33.
348 Fahs, 168 F.2d at 958.
341
342
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Foundry Company, the taxpayer, was organized and incorporated ... [ with] all of the assets of the business which [the father] then owned individually ... [transferred] for stock in the
corporation.”349 In the transaction “[t]he father received 1181
shares and his son 1176 shares, the father thereby retaining only a
bare majority of the stock issued.”350 The Fifth Circuit found control
was not met.351 In Stanton, the Third Circuit attempted to distinguish Fahs because the transferor there “did not at the time
of the transfer have the absolute right to designate who would
receive all the stock in the transferee.”352
A somewhat similar case to Fahs was the Tax Court decision, Mojonnier & Sons, Inc. v. Commissioner.353 In Mojonnier,
the court found the control requirements of a precursor to section 351 were not satisfied and therefore the transferee taxpayer
was entitled to fair market value basis in the assigned property.354
The transferors owned less than eighty percent of the transferee
after the assignment with other shares going directly to other
individuals, including the transferors’ son and a son-in-law, both
of whom received their shares in connection with their work in
the business.355 Although the court emphasized that these were
not gifts,356 what was key to the outcome was that the shares
were “not issued to the transferors and then conveyed by them to
members of their family, but was issued directly to the members of
the family in accordance with the plan and offer of F. E. Mojonnier
[a transferor].”357 As such, “the transferors were never the owners

Id.
350 Id.
351 The government had argued that “the son ... by virtue of the agreement
with his father in 1921, acquired an equitable one-half interest in the land
involved, which thereafter placed him and his father, as joint transferors, in
‘control’ of taxpayer immediately after the transfer.” Id. at 959. This contention was rejected by the court. Id.
352 512 F.2d at 18.
353 12 T.C. 837, 848–49 (1949).
354 Id. at 849, 851.
355 Id. at 840, 849.
356 Id. at 848. The Service’s theory was “that in substance the transaction
was a transfer of the entire business by the transferors in exchange for all of the
stock and thereafter a series of gifts by them to members of their family.” Id.
357 Id. at 850.
349
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or holders of a sufficient amount of stock to place them in ‘control’ of the corporation.”358
The conflict in the case law with respect to Professor Jensen’s
gift hypothetical variation where the shares go directly from the
transferee corporation to S certainly evidence lack of consistency
and thus predictability.359 Even his initial hypothetical is not
entirely free from doubt, as evidenced by Revenue Ruling 55-36,360
cited by Professor Jensen.361 Revenue Ruling 55-36 was another
preplanned gift case involving a predecessor to section 351.362
The Service ruled that this gain would be recognized in the initial assignment by an individual taxpayer when the donee liquidated the transferee as part of the plan.363 The Service stated
that “in the instant case the transaction served no corporate
business purpose for the transfer of the stock of X Corporation
[the transferred property] to the Z Corporation [the transferee
corporation].”364 Furthermore, “[t]he Z Corporation did not engage in the conduct of any trade or business and did not remain
in existence, except for a brief time as was necessary to implement the donation of X Corporation’s stock to the Y Corporation.”365 It determined that “the individual shareholder was not
in control of the Z Corporation within the meaning of section
112(h) of such Code, since his ownership of the stock was only
transitory and the object of the plan was to place control in the
hands of the Y Corporation.”366 While the ruling can be distinguished from Professor Jensen’s initial hypothetical because
transferee was liquidated, it leaves open the possibility the result might be the same had transferee remained in existence
because “his ownership of the stock was [still] only transitory
and the object of the plan was to place control in the hands of
the Y Corporation.”367 While the result would likely have been

Id.
See Jensen, supra note 1, at 355–56.
360 Rev. Rul. 55-36, 1955-1 C.B. 340, 340.
361 See Jensen, supra note 1, at 367.
362 Rev. Rul. 55-36, 1955-1 C.B. 340, 341.
363 Id. at 341–42.
364 Id. at 341.
365 Id.
366 Id.
367 Id.
358
359
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different had corporation Z, the transferee, remained in existence, the ruling still serves to undermine the notion that section
351 and its predecessor are not subject to the step transaction
doctrine in gift scenarios because the transferor had freedom to
not make the gift.368
Professor Jensen was also critical of the treatment of underwriting transactions.369 He poses a hypothetical that, simultaneously with a transfer of property to a Newco, eighty percent
of Newco shares are distributed to a firm commitment underwriter for cash.370 He wrote:
U’s [the firm commitment underwriter] intentionally transitory
ownership of stock should preclude nonrecognition. It is the
height of artificiality to treat the transaction as complete for
tax purposes upon U’s purchase of the stock when the only
reason for U’s purchase of the stock was to immediately resell
it to the public at a profit. U’s controlling stock ownership was
transitory; disposition of the stock was preplanned; and practical commercial necessity compelled U to dispose of the stock
as quickly as possible, that is, its need to make its profit and


While not a gift situation, the idea that steps should not be collapsed so
long as the transferor had legal freedom of action not to engage in a transaction where control was lost was also undercut by an earlier ruling, Rev. Rul.
54-96, 1954-1 C.B. 111, 112. In that ruling, X corporation, which had engaged in
two lines of business, transferred one of its businesses to Y corporation “and
as a part of a prearranged plan, transferred all of the stock of Y to the Z Corporation, an unrelated corporation that has been engaged in business for many
years, in exchange for which Z issued to X 20 percent of Z’s voting stock.” Id.
at 111. The Service stated that “[t]he two steps of the transaction described
above were part of a prearranged integrated plan and may [therefore] not be
considered independently of each other for Federal income tax purposes.” Id.
at 112. Therefore, the Service ruled that:
[s]ince as a result of the whole transaction the X Corporation
was not in control of the Y Corporation after transferring a
part of its assets to that corporation, the transaction did not
constitute a reorganization as defined in section 112(g)(1)(D),
nor did it constitute a tax-free transfer under section 122(b)(5).
Id. A similar analysis and conclusion was reached in Rev. Rul. 70-140, 1970-1
C.B. 73, 73–74.
369 See Jensen, supra note 1, at 357–59. He focused on Revenue Ruling 78294, 1978-2 C.B. 141 because at the time of his article, Reg. § 1.351-1(a)(3)(I)
had not yet been promulgated and the ruling made obsolete, but his rationale
should not be affected by the foregoing.
370 Id. at 357.
368
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to terminate its exposure to the possibility of adverse market
price fluctuations.371

He pointed out that it does not make sense to permit section 351 treatment to stay intact with the underwriter transaction but not when the transferor is under a binding obligation to
dispose of the shares to another third party.372 While his assertion is certainly not unreasonable, as noted above, at least one
commentary offered a rationale for treating underwriting differently from third party sales.373 In any event the effect of the regulation, as well as prior guidance, is to avoid thwarting a newly
formed corporation from going public.374 Perhaps, however, it
might have been better conceptually had Congress addressed
underwriting by amending section 351.
Professor Jensen contended that “[t]he lack of any clearly
articulated rationale [for deciding whether or not to use the step
transaction doctrine in determining section 351 control] makes it
difficult to resolve novel questions and to develop a coherent and
consistent body of law.”375 He cited the diverse reasonings given
by the courts in cases dealing with options to purchase transferee
shares as an illustration.376 He posited a fact pattern wherein an
individual incorporates his sole proprietorship “but who prior to
the transfer had given an enforceable option to another to buy
the stock.”377 Professor Jensen then referred to the various justifications given by the courts in deciding cases of this sort including
freedom of action, transitory nature of the transferor’s control, and
interdependence.378 His point about conflicting rationalizations

Id. at 358.
372 Id.
373 See Tillinghast & Paully, supra note 319, at 264.
374 Id.
375 See Jensen, supra note 1, at 371.
376 Id. at 371–72.
377 Id. at 371.
378 Id. Professor Jensen’s discussion of this was as follows:
If the relevant factor is freedom of action, presumably the
transferor would fail the control requirement, since he did not
have complete freedom of action over the shares at the time of
the transfer. Alternatively, if the crucial question is whether
the prospective purchaser is bound to buy the transferor’s
371
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for decisions with respect to options and elsewhere is certainly
fair.379 While there are many cases correctly holding, in the opinion
of this Article, that the mere granting of the option in circumstances where exercise is not a foregone conclusion does not affect
control, there is also some contrary authority.380
Another ruling Professor Jensen cited for intellectual inconsistencies, with respect to the application of step transaction
doctrine when determining section 351 control, is Revenue Ruling

stock, a mere option would not destroy the transferor’s control
since an optionee has no obligation to exercise the option. If the
relevant inquiry is the transitory nature of the transferor’s control, the answer might turn on when the option could be exercised, or possibly when in fact it was exercised. If interdependence
is the key, then presumably one would need to know whether
exercise of the option was essential to the successful completion
of the plan. Each of these factors has been articulated at one time
or another in section 351 cases. Because the courts lack a coherent unifying rationale, however, they are unable to determine
the significance and the relative importance of these factors.
Id. at 371–72 (footnotes omitted).
379 See id. at 359–60, 367–69, 412.
380 See, e.g., Rothman et al., supra note 193, at 29; In Harder v. Comm’r,
17 T.C.M.(CCH) 494, 497 (1958), the taxpayer had on January 2, 1952 transferred his sole proprietorship to a newly formed corporation for all its stock
but “[s]imultaneously ... a five-party agreement ... was entered into between
Harder [the transferor and certain parties including three individuals] ... and
petitioner corporation ....” Id. These individuals were given on or after July 3,
1952, “’the right to purchase’ from Harder [the transferor] shares of stock in
the corporation in certain designated portions set forth in the agreement.” Id.
Even though the exercise of the right would have brought transferor under
the control threshold under a predecessor provision to section 351, the court
found the transfer to meet the statutory requirements. Id. at 499. A comparable
result was reached in National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Comm’r, 20 T.C. 636, 648
(1953), aff’d, 220 F.2d 415 (8th Cir. 1955). There, the transferor “was obligated to
grant to the employee-organizers an option to purchase the 300,000 shares.”
Id. at 646–47. The Tax Court continued, “[w]e think it is significant that the
predecessor was not obligated to do more than grant an option. It had not
entered into a contract of sale or in any way divested itself of ownership.” Id.
at 647. In comparison, the Ninth Circuit determined in Barker v. United
States, 200 F.2d 223, 229 (9th Cir. 1952), that the transferor did not have the
necessary control by virtue of granting options. The court said that the transferor “had relinquished the right to dispose of the shares as they wished.
Such a restriction upon their freedom of action deprived the Lawrence Barker
Interests of unrestricted control of the stock.” Id.
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54-96.381 Corporation X, which engaged in two separate businesses,
first transferred one of those businesses to a newly formed corporation Y in exchange for its stock and then “as part of a prearranged plan, transferred all of the stock of Y to Z Corporation,
an unrelated corporation ... in exchange for ... 20 percent of Z’s
voting stock.”382 Because “[t]he two steps of the transaction ...
were part of a prearranged integrated plan” the control requirement
was not met under a precursor to section 351.383 Professor Jensen
pointed out that there was “no indication [in the ruling] that the
transferor-corporation was legally bound at the time of the transfer to engage in the subsequent stock-for-stock swap although
that was its plan.”384 Professor Jensen complained that the ruling “cannot be squared” with the position not to invoke the doctrine in general with respect to preplanned gifts and transfers to
underwriters.385 His point is valid, although the treatment with
respect to underwriters is sui generis.386
To briefly digress from Professor Jensen’s assessment of
the irreconcilable decisions and rulings in this area, sixteen
years after Revenue Ruling 54-96, the Service issued a very similar ruling, albeit this time there was a binding commitment to
swap the transferor’s interest in the transferee and not just a
preexisting integrated plan.387 In Revenue Ruling 70-140, an individual, A, owned all the outstanding stock of X corporation.388 He
“also operated a similar business in the form of a sole proprietorship” and a third party Y was interested in acquiring both
businesses, with its voting stock used as the consideration.389
The Service indicated that
[p]ursuant to an agreement between A and Y, an unrelated corporation, A transferred all the assets of the sole proprietorship to X
in exchange for additional shares of X stock. A then transferred


See Jensen, supra note 1, at 367–68.
382 Rev. Rul. 54-96, 1954-1 C.B. 111, 111.
383 Id. at 112.
384 See Jensen, supra note 1, at 367.
385 Id. at 367–68.
386 See Tillinghast & Paully, supra note 319, at 264.
387 Rev. Rul. 70-140, 1970-1 C.B. 73, 73.
388 Id.
389 Id.
381
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all his X stock to Y solely in exchange for voting common stock of
Y, which was widely held.390

The Service held that the transfer of the sole proprietorship did not
qualify under section 351.391 The ruling was discussed in an article
by Steven Bowen, also discussed in Section II.B of this Article.392
Bowen agreed with the result (as would presumably many
commentators with the notable exception of Professor Jensen),
since A was not in control of X due to the binding contract with
Y.393 Bowen pointed out, however, that the Service’s reasoning “took
a somewhat different approach.”394 The Service stated that “[t]he
two steps of the transaction described above were part of a prearranged integrated plan and may not be considered independently
of each other for Federal income tax purposes.”395 Furthermore,
[t]he receipt by A of the additional stock of X in exchange for
the sole proprietorship assets is transitory and without substance for tax purposes since it is apparent that the assets of
the sole proprietorship were transferred to X for the purpose
of enabling Y to acquire such assets without the recognition of
gain to A.396

The Service ruled that A was taxed on the realized gain on the
transfer of the sole proprietorship to X, but “[t]he exchange by A
of all the outstanding stock of X, solely for voting common stock
of Y, other than the Y stock received in payment for the sole proprietorship assets, is a reorganization within the meaning of
section 368(a)(1)(B) of the Code.”397
Thirty-three years later, the Service issued Revenue Ruling
2003-51 which distinguished Revenue Ruling 70-140, and permitted section 351 treatment, despite loss of control pursuant to
a binding contract, albeit in a very limited circumstance.398 The
facts of the ruling were as follows: W is a domestic corporation

Id.
Id.
392 See Bowen, supra note 11, at 738; supra Section II.B.
393 See Bowen, supra note 11, at 738–39.
394 Id. at 738.
395 Rev. Rul. 70-140, 1970-1 C.B. 73, 73.
396 Id.
397 Id. at 73–74.
398 Rev. Rul. 2003-51, 2003-1 C.B. 938, 940.
390
391
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that conducts businesses A (fair market value $40x), B (fair market
value $30x) and C (fair market value $30x).399 An unrelated domestic corporation X engages in business A, which it does through
its wholly owned domestic subsidiary Y.400 Y’s fair market value
is $30x.401 To achieve W and X’s objective to consolidate their
respective A businesses, the parties enter into a binding agreement with the following steps.402 W transfers its A business to
newly formed corporation Z, in return for all the Z shares (first
transfer).403 Immediately thereafter, W transfers all its Z shares
to Y in return for additional Y shares (second transfer).404 “Simultaneous[ly] with the second transfer, X contributes $30x to Y”
in exchange for additional Y shares (third transfer). This results
in W and X owning respectively forty percent and sixty percent
of Y.405 Finally, after the second and third transfers, Y contributes $30x and the assets in its A business to Z (fourth transfer).406 The ruling indicated that “[v]iewed separately, each of
the first transfer, the combined second and third transfer, and
the fourth transfer qualifies as a transfer described in [section]
351.”407 The issue posed by that ruling was:
Whether a transfer of assets to a corporation (the “first corporation”) in exchange for an amount of stock in the first corporation
constituting control satisfies the control requirement of [section] 351 of the Internal Revenue Code if, pursuant to a binding
agreement entered into by the transferor with a third party prior
to the exchange, the transferor transfers the stock of the first
corporation to another corporation (the “second corporation”)
simultaneously with the transfer of assets by the third party to
the second corporation, and immediately thereafter, the transferor
and the third party are in control of the second corporation.408

The Service ruled that under these circumstances the first
transfer satisfied the section 351 control requirements, that is the

Id. at 938.
400 Id.
401 Id.
402 Id.
403 Id.
404 Id.
405 Id.
406 Id.
407 Id.
408 Id.
399
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second transfer, although undertaken pursuant to a prearranged
agreement, did not cause the first transfer to fail to meet the
section 351 control requirements.409 In reaching this result the
Service reasoned that “[t]reating a transfer of property that is followed by a nontaxable disposition of the stock received as a transfer
described in [section] 351 is not necessarily inconsistent with the
purpose of [section] 351.”410 That purpose being “to facilitate the
rearrangement of the transferor’s interest in its property.”411
The Service indicated that “[a]ccordingly, the control requirement may be satisfied in such a case, even if the stock received
is transferred pursuant to a binding commitment in place upon
the transfer of the property in exchange for stock.”412
The Service distinguished Revenue Ruling 70-140 stating
that in that fact pattern “there was no alternative form of transaction that would have qualified for nonrecognition treatment.”413 In
contrast to Revenue Ruling 70-140, the Service indicated that here:
W’s transfer of the business A assets to Z was not necessary
for W and X to combine their business A assets in a holding
company structure in a manner that would have qualified for
nonrecognition of gain or loss under [section] 351. A transfer
of W’s business A assets to Y in exchange for Y stock as part of a
plan that included X’s transfer of $30x to Y in exchange for Y
stock, and Y’s transfer of the business A assets and $30x to Z
in exchange for all of the Z stock, would have qualified as successive transfers described in [section] 351.414

Jack Cummings indicated that one might interpret Revenue
Ruling 2003-51 as follows:
Whenever (1) the potentially decontrolling event is a nonrecognition transaction, and (2) the property exchanged with the
corporation might have been transferred in a nonrecognition
transaction with the transferee of the stock, then (3) the step
transaction doctrine will not be applied to prevent the shareholders from having control in the first purported section 351


Id. at 940.
410 Id.
411 Id.
412 Id.
413 Id.
414 Id.
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exchange, “immediately after.” “Might have been” does not require
any finding of actual practicality.415

While the foregoing was a departure from the discussion of
Professor Jensen’s article, it does serve to illustrate that the application of the step transaction doctrine to the section 351 control
requirement has engendered considerable confusion.416 Another
problem Professor Jensen had with the approach often taken by
the courts and the Service was that he thought it was inconsistent with the intent of Congress in enacting the antecedent to
section 351.417 Professor Jensen believed “that Congress enacted
the 80% requirement to prevent existing corporations with readily marketable stock from using their stock to buy goods and
supplies on a tax free basis to their vendors.”418 In other words,

See Cummings, supra note 188, at 950; Cummings cautioned, however,
that “the ruling doesn’t imply the existence of a general principle that the
taxpayer wins if it could have gotten the tax result it wanted by doing the
transaction another way.” Id. Furthermore, Cummings stated that “there is
no principled reason for the IRS to create a could-have-done-it-another-way
basis for this particular the [section] 351 ruling.” Id. at 951. Cummings was
critical of some of the theories espoused as to the Service’s intellectual basis
for the ruling. Id. at 952. For example, he cited the comment that the ruling is
consistent with the fact “that the Service has long respected cascading section
351 exchanges.” Jerrod G. Blanchard, Jr., The Ghost of Kimbell-Diamond: The
Current State of the Law Pertaining to Multi-Step Corporate Transactions, 71
TAX LAW. 445, 483 (2018) (footnote omitted). Cummings writes that
Cascading 351’s don’t explain Rev. Rul. 2003-51. Cascading
351s never violated the words of the code. Section 351 doesn’t
require that the corporation retain the contributed property. The
step transaction doctrine as applied to ‘control immediately after’
hasn’t been applied to the different question of the double drop
of property. The shareholder of the top corporation never owned
stock of the second-tier corporation, and it made no step transaction sense to hypothesize a drop directly to that lower-tier
subsidiary. In contrast there is a problem with decontrol because section 351 requires control ‘immediately after,’ and the
courts and the IRS routinely have applied step transaction
concepts to that requirement. Therefore, the allowance of cascading 351s is not relevant to a decision not to apply the step
transaction doctrine to a decontrolling transfer of stock.
Id. at 952–53 (footnote omitted).
416 See supra Section II.B; supra note 415 and accompanying text.
417 See Jensen, supra note 1, at 397–98.
418 Id. at 398.
415
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according to Professor Jensen, “the 80% control requirement prevents a supplier, for example, from selling supplies to a corporation without recognizing income or gain simply by accepting the
corporation’s stock in lieu of cash.”419
Professor Jensen asserted that “[d]espite the paucity of
legislative history, strong circumstantial evidence exists for rejecting the contention that the 80% control requirement was intended to limit nonrecognition to mere changes in the form of
the transferor’s investment.”420 He suggested that “the legislative
history shows that Congress was not obsessed with restricting
nonrecognition to transactions involving mere changes in the form
of the taxpayer’s investment.”421 Instead, according to Professor
Jensen, “its primary purpose in 1921 was to facilitate desirable
business readjustments and to avoid recognition of gain where
there was no realization of a cash profit.”422
He also questioned the rationale provided in Intermountain Lumber and elsewhere that section 351’s:
[B]asic premise ... is to avoid recognition of gain or loss resulting
from transfer of property to a corporation which works a change
in form only .... Accordingly, if the transferor sells his stock as
part of the same transaction, the transaction is taxable because there has been more than a mere change of form.423

Professor Jensen argued that if ten unrelated individuals transfer diverse properties to a Newco to be used in its manufacturing
business, this is a good section 351 transaction for these individuals “[y]et by no stretch of the imagination can it be described as a
mere change in form of each investor’s respective investment.”424
Another example that he cited, as to why a premise that section
351 is based on no change in form is faulty is a fact pattern in
Revenue Ruling 79-194, wherein Z and a group of investors form
Newco, with Z receiving eighty percent of its stock, and “[p]ursuant

Id.
420 Id. at 387–88 (footnote omitted).
421 Id. at 393.
422 Id.
423 Id. at 376 (footnote omitted) (quoting Intermountain Lumber Co. v.
Comm’r, 65 T.C. 1025, 1033–34 (1976)).
424 Id. at 377.
419
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to ... [a binding] agreement Z sold an amount of its Newco stock ... to
bring its ownership down to 49[%].”425 The Service found the
control requirements of section 351 were met stating that “[t]he
fact that there was a shift in ownership of stock among the transferors after their exchanges with Newco does not affect the application of section 351(a).”426 Professor Jensen contended that
this, and in other examples he referred to, established “that radical changes can occur in the relationship of the transferor to the
transferred assets in a transaction, and yet the transaction may
still qualify for nonrecognition under section 351. This casts serious
doubt upon validity of the mere change of form rationale of the
control requirement.”427
Professor Jensen summarized his criticism of the utilization of the step transaction doctrine for determining if section
351 control has been satisfied as follows:
[I]n certain instances, a transferor’s divestiture of control shortly
after the transfer pursuant to a preconceived plan disqualifies
the transaction under section 351 while in others it does not.
Neither the courts nor the Service have articulated a persuasive rationale explaining these apparently inconsistent applications of the step transaction doctrine. Indeed, there was no
reasoned justification for application of the step transaction
doctrine to section 351 in the first place.428

He also pointed to the “express language adopted by Congress which demands only that the transferor have control of the
corporation immediately after the exchange.”429 He acknowledged
that “it is sometimes appropriate to deviate from the literal language of the statute when necessary to effectuate a statute’s
policy.”430 He asserted, however, that in this case “deviation from
the literal language furthers no discernible policy but defeats

Rev. Rul. 79-194, 1979-1 C.B. 145, 145; see Jensen, supra note 1, at 380–81.
Rev. Rul. 79-194, 1979-1 C.B. 145, 146.
427 Jensen, supra note 1, at 381.
428 Id. at 368. Another criticism Professor Jensen had was that “[c]ourts
purporting to apply the [mutual interdependence] test outside the section 351
context have been much more ready to find that events are interdependent
than when applying the test within the section 351 context.” Id. at 362 (footnote omitted).
429 Id. at 394.
430 Id. at 394–95.
425
426

392 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 13:331
the most reasonable interpretation of the policies underlying
section 351.”431
Professor Jensen contended that the conclusion from the
foregoing is the complete removal of any role for the step transaction doctrine in determining whether control under section
351 was fulfilled.432 He argued that the policy behind section 351
is not well served if the loss of control, even if caused by a binding
obligation, results in all the realized gain being recognized.433
Under his proposed statutory interpretation, section 351 control
will be deemed to have been met “so long as the transferor[s]
own at least eighty percent of the stock immediately after the
exchange, even if the transferor[s] thereafter divest themselves
of control pursuant to a preexisting binding agreement.”434 Under his proposal, if transferor received eighty percent of transferee subject to a binding obligation to sell five percent to a third
party only the five percent actually sold would result in gain
recognition.435 He explained that:
In every case where the courts have applied the doctrine (e.g.,
the binding obligation cases), the transferor technically complied with the statute, that is, the transferor for some finite
period of time owned 80% of the corporation’s stock. Thus, the
only reason for not according nonrecognition under section 351
would be that to do so would frustrate a policy of the statute,
and the only policy reason offered for deviating from the literal
language of the statute was the mere change of form rationale. Upon analysis we found that rationale to be unsatisfactory and thus did not justify deviation from the statute’s
literal language. Accordingly, there is no occasion to use the
step transaction doctrine here since there simply is no policy
to vindicate.436

In sum, Professor Jensen claimed that his recommended construction of section 351 control is consistent with the statutory language,437 avoids Draconian penalties,438 is harmonious with both

Id. at 395.
Id. at 424.
433 Id. at 421.
434 Id. at 408.
435 Id.
436 Id. at 417.
437 Id. at 394.
431
432
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Congressional objectives to facilitate business readjustments,439
and taxing only those having liquid wherewithal to pay.440
Another commentator echoed Professor Jensen’s view that
no post transfer event should result in a loss of control for section 351 purposes.441 This observer advocated that “[t]he Treasury
should ... adopt a regulation reversing the judicial application of
the step transaction doctrine to the post-incorporation sale.”442
He believed that “[t]he sale of some portion of an investment in
the wake of the incorporation will give rise to recognition on that
portion of the interest actually disposed of. The interests of fair
and efficient taxation demand no more.”443
Professor Jensen’s criticism with the inconsistent application, and in many cases a lack of a coherent rationale, for whether
the step transaction doctrine should be used in determining control for section 351 purposes by the courts and the Service is
warranted.444 Furthermore, this Article is in accord with Professor

Id. at 395.
Id. at 394.
440 Id. Interestingly and somewhat paradoxically Professor Jensen is a strong
advocate of applying the step transaction expansively “to determine whether
to integrate the initial transfer of property for stock with the transferor’s subsequent sale of his stock when applying the boot provisions of section 351(b).”
Id. at 417. He would even go as far as to utilize the end result in analyzing
when the steps should be combined for this purpose. Id. Professor Jensen’s
reasoning is as follows:
The basic premise here is that Congress has prescribed the tax
consequences flowing from an incorporation of business. The
parties should not be able to evade those consequences by manipulating the formal structure of the transaction. Since the step
transaction is a means of implementing policy, it should be used
to prevent such evasion. Note that here the policy being vindicated is not some semi-mystical concept of the purpose of the
statute such as the mere change of form rationale, but rather the
explicit tax consequences spelled out by Congress for incorporating transactions. The policy is clear, and the step transaction
doctrine being an instrument for implementing policy should
be used.
Id. at 417–18.
441 See Note, Losing Control: Toward a New Understanding of the Taxation of
Post-Incorporation Stock Sales, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1661, 1678 n.71 (1995) [hereinafter Losing Control].
442 Id.
443 Id. at 1678 (footnote omitted).
444 See Jensen, supra note 1, at 367.
438
439
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Jensen that a justification for section 351 treatment grounded upon
the preservation of form is tenuous conceptually and not defensible
from the legislative history of a predecessor provision.445 Nevertheless, his proposed prescription for addressing serious glitches with
the doctrine’s utilization does not warrant its complete abandonment in determining section 351 control.446 Moreover, some of the
underpinnings for Professor Jensen’s conclusion that in effect from
both a textualist and intentionalist approach, there is no support for
utilizing the step transaction doctrine to determine whether control for section 351 purposes is affected by the disposition of
shares by a transferor post contribution, appear to be flawed.447
Turning first to his comment that “[i]t is remarkable that
the courts felt no need to justify a result [i.e., applying the step
transaction doctrine to deny nonrecognition upon a post contribution event] clearly at odds with the language of the statute.”448
While as Professor Jensen points out, there are a number of cases,
in addition to the dicta in American Bantam Car discussed above,449
interpreting section 351’s predecessor as providing literally that
momentary ownership suffices,450 it is certainly questionable that
if a transferor is legally bound, for example, to deliver the shares
she receives at closing whether she in fact met the literal language
in the statute.451 There is also a valid argument, despite the “immediately after” language in section 351(a), that the literal requirement has been fulfilled when the transferor’s freedom of
action with respect to the shares is otherwise substantially restricted.452 In other words, someone should arguably not be deemed
to have ownership for this purpose when the benefit of such ownership is limited to receiving a prescribed payment for the shares
in question or in certain circumstances where such ownership is
fleeting and ephemeral.453

Compare Losing Control, supra note 441, at 1661, with Jensen, supra
note 1, at 387–88.
446 Losing Control, supra note 441, at 1671.
447 See Jensen, supra note 1, at 369.
448 See id.
449 Am. Bantam Car Co. v. Comm’r, 11 T.C. 397, 404 (1948); see supra notes
291–313.
450 See Jensen, supra note 1, at 369–71.
451 Id. at 371–72.
452 See id. at 370.
453 See id.
445
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In terms of the intent of the statute, let’s accept Professor
Jensen’s scholarly research that “[the] primary purpose in 1921
was to facilitate desirable business readjustments and to avoid recognition of gain where there was no realization of a cash profit.”454
If Congress since then shared Professor Jensen’s indignation with
utilizing the doctrine to determine control under section 351 and
its predecessors,455 why didn’t it revise the statute to preclude
its use when section 351 was first enacted or in the many decades since that time?456 Perhaps Congress has, and had, concerns about according nonrecognition in circumstances where
ownership is transitory and/or where the original transfer would
not have occurred but for an interdependent disposition of sufficient shares to bring the transferor or transferors under the
eighty percent threshold.457
With respect to Professor Jensen’s extreme remedy, there
should be wariness with throwing decades of decisions and rulings in this area into the trash bin where many, albeit certainly
not all, appear to be conceptually sound.458 There is significant
authority to the effect that at least under certain circumstances
“[i]f the disposition is integrated with the initial section 351 exchange, the requirement of control immediately after the exchange
is not satisfied, in essence because the transferors’ stock ownership is viewed as too transitory to be counted toward control.”459
It is submitted that the optimal course of action to address at
least some of Professor Jensen’s concerns is for the Service and
the courts to adopt a more uniform approach to when to employ
the step transaction doctrine to determine if section 351 control
has been met.
The Tax Court in Intermountain Lumber observed that:
A determination of “ownership,” as that term is used in section 368(c) and for purposes of control under section 351, depends
upon the obligations and freedom of action of the transferee with
respect to the stock when he acquired it from the corporation.


Id. at 393.
455 Id.
456 See 26 U.S.C. § 351 (note the lack of relevant amendment).
457 See Jensen, supra note 1, at 380.
458 See id. at 393.
459 See id. at 252.
454
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Such traditional ownership attributes as legal title, voting
rights, and possession of stock certificates are not conclusive.
If the transferee, as part of the transaction by which the shares
were acquired, has irrevocably foregone or relinquished at
that time the legal right to determine whether to keep the
shares, ownership in such shares is lacking for purposes of
section 351.460

Just because the Intermountain Lumber Tax Court statement that “the basic premise of section 351 is to avoid recognition
of gain or loss resulting from transfer of property to a corporation
which works a change of form only”461 is of questionable validity,
does not mean the decision and the rest of the court’s reasoning
including the above quoted passage should be nullified. In short,
Professor Jensen has provided a superb analysis identifying the
problems with the decision to utilize or not utilize the canon for
determining if control was met under section 351,462 and his
remedy would achieve transparency and consistency,463 but it
would not make for sound tax policy.464 There are other recommendations put forth by practitioners and scholars with respect
to the utilization of the step transaction doctrine that merit consideration in the section 351 control context.465
Steven Bowen, while not addressing section 351 control
per se, put forward ideas for restricting when courts and the
Service should utilize the step transaction doctrine.466 Bowen, in
effect, asserted that in a multistep corporate stock transaction
where there is a binding commitment, and in some circumstances
when there is mutual interdependence of the steps, the utilization of the canon is generally proper.467 With respect to the use
of the mutual interdependence test to collapse steps, he suggested
there be “some form of economic compulsion ... [that] makes the
completion of the later steps likely, if not a foregone conclusion—e.g., because a later step eliminates any exposure to an

Intermountain Lumber Co. v. Comm’r, 65 T.C. 1025, 1031 (1976).
Id. at 1033.
462 See Jensen, supra note 1, at 381.
463 See id. at 426.
464 See supra text accompanying note 458.
465 See Losing Control, supra note 441, at 1677–78.
466 Bowen, supra note 11, at 722.
467 See id. at 727.
460
461
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unacceptable risk of loss attributable to the first step.”468 He recommended that economic compulsion “be narrowly construed, so
as to avoid the open-endedness characteristic of the end result
test.”469 Bowen asserted that “economic compulsion” could have
application in circumstances of “actual or threatened lawsuits and
foreclosures and various rights and obligations set forth in unrelated or collateral agreements.”470 He reasoned that “[a] mutual
interdependence test that rests principally on economic significance as opposed to taxpayer intent may be viewed perhaps as a
variation of the binding commitment test.”471
Bowen believed that “the end result test in corporate stock
transactions ... be sharply curtailed if not prohibited.”472 He expressed wariness of a court deciding whether to invoke the doctrine based on a determination of “the parties’ intentions [that
are] deduced from particular facts and circumstances.”473 Bowen
contended that “the fruitfulness—or fruitlessness—of formally
separate transactions should be judged on the basis of their particular economic consequences and that economically meaningful transactions should be respected, generally without regard to
what the parties ‘hoped’ or intended to achieve.”474 Eliminating or
at least substantially curtailing the utilization of the end result
test for determining section 351 control would certainly provide
more certainty and consistency for decisions in this area. 475

Id. Grossberg, however, argued that
an interdependence test based on economic compulsion is too
narrow and does not properly account for some transactions that
clearly should be stepped together. Such transactions include
two-step mergers in which the second step is intended but contingent on some external event, such as board or shareholder
approval. The first step is still economically desirable, even if
not preferable, when isolated from the second step.
Grossberg, supra note 194, at 403–04.
469 Bowen, supra note 11, at 727.
470 Id. (footnotes omitted). Bowen advocated that economic compulsion “should
not include such things as market forces, which are generally applicable, or ...
the likely consequences of potentially applicable federal income tax rules.” Id.
471 Id.
472 Id. at 722 (footnote omitted).
473 Id. at 723.
474 Id.
475 See Jensen, supra note 1, at 426.
468
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At the same time, the doctrine would continue to play a necessary role.476
One example Bowen cited to explain his position on when
mutual interdependence should be deemed or not deemed to exist
for section 351 control purposes was the Tax Court decision of
Weikel v. Commissioner.477 In that case, a dentist transferred an
amalgam patent and some other assets to a newly formed corporation (D) for its shares in November 1973.478 It was done so, at
the suggestion of Johnson & Johnson (J&J),479 which had expressed interest in a possible joint venture with the taxpayer.480
By the time of the contribution, there was an oral tentative understanding between the taxpayer and a representative from
J&J of some key terms,481 but there was no definitive signed
agreement until January 1974 which provided for an exchange
of J&J stock for D stock.482 The issue was whether the purported
section 351 followed by a “B” reorganization should be respected
or stepped together as a taxable sale of assets, the latter being
how J&J treated the transaction.483
The taxpayer prevailed which Bowen believed was the correct result.484 Bowen was, nevertheless, critical485 of the Tax Court’s
comment that “[u]nder the interdependence test it is clear that
petitioners intended to incorporate whether or not they finalized
an agreement with J&J for an exchange of stock.”486 He was,
however, complimentary487 of the Tax Court’s statement that its
mission was to “determine whether the incorporation of ... [D] was
an event with an independent economic substance.”488 According
to Bowen, this latter statement “is the purpose of the mutual interdependences test ... [and] not on what he may or may not have

See id.
Weikel v. Comm’r, 51 T.C.M.(CCH) 432, 438 (1986).
478 Id. at 435.
479 Id. at 434.
480 Id.
481 Id. at 436.
482 Id.
483 Id. at 437.
484 See Bowen, supra note 11, at 739.
485 Id.
486 Weikel, 51 T.C.M.(CCH) at 440.
487 See Bowen, supra note 11, at 739.
488 Weikel, 51 T.C.M.(CCH) at 439.
476
477
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intended to achieve.”489 Bowen asserted that in applying the mutual interdependence what should have mattered to the Tax Court
was simply that:
[The taxpayer] incorporated ... [D] at a time when he had no
agreement with ... [J&J] or any other prospective purchaser.
The patent was in corporate solution .... [The Taxpayer] could
not have retrieved it without incurring (at that time) a shareholder level tax; and ... [the Taxpayer] owned ... D’s] stock with
all the attendant benefits and burdens of ownership.490

Some other commentators believe Bowen went too far in
imposing restrictions on the step transaction doctrine.491 Philip
J. Levine and Britt M. Haxton expressed the view that “contrary
to the thesis of the Bowen article, no one step transaction test
should apply in every situation or to every code provision and
that, for better or worse, each case must be evaluated individually to determine whether application of the step transaction
doctrine is appropriate.”492 While Bowen’s proposal might serve
to unnecessarily handcuff the Service, Levine and Haxton’s case
by case methodology doesn’t appear to adequately address the
plethora of intellectual inconsistencies in this area.493
Another commentator, Jonathan D. Grossberg, who like
Levine and Haxton as well as Bowen, addressed the step transaction in general, rather than specifically its function with satisfying control under section 351, noted that the end result test “has
been the subject of much criticism because it is so malleable.”494
The determination of whether a taxpayer intended to take succeeding steps has “create[d] ... problems of fairness, notice and
certainty.”495 Professor Joshua D. Rosenberg articulated his objection to the use of the end result as follows:

See Bowen, supra note 11, at 739.
490 Id.
491 See Levine & Haxton, supra note 202, at 1260 (arguing that Bowen’s position is too restrictive).
492 Id.
493 Compare Bowen, supra note 11, at 722 (arguing for the elimination of the
end result test from the step transaction doctrine), with Levine & Haxton, supra
note 202, at 1260 (arguing for a case-by-case application of the end result test).
494 See Grossberg, supra note 194, at 409–10 (footnote omitted).
495 Id. at 411.
489
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[W]hile it provides a ready means to support an allegation that
two legally independent exchanges are actually parts of a single,
integrated transaction, it provides almost no basis whatsoever
to support an allegation that two actions are ever separate. If
all that is required to join two separate exchanges together is
that at the time the first is engaged in, the taxpayer also intends to engage in the second, this test could treat as a “transaction” every single exchange intended by a taxpayer at the time
he engages in any other, seemingly unrelated, exchange. For
example, imagine that A forms a corporation in 1987. At the
time, A intends to make the corporation successful and to have it
go public in 1990. A also intends to purchase Treasury bonds in
1988 and to sell short some stock in an unrelated enterprise in
1987. All of these purchases and sales are planned to maximize
A’s profit potential and to minimize his risk; yet to suggest
that these events are a single “transaction” would be absurd.496

As to relying solely, or mainly, on a binding commitment
test, Grossberg suggested it is easily preventable by taxpayers
in that they “need only to avoid obligating themselves in writing
to take later steps.”497 He also expressed concern with the mutual
interdependence test because it “does not look to whether the parties indicated in their agreement whether the steps are connected
but asks a third person to determine whether the steps appear
to that third person to be so interdependent as to be inseparable.”498 Professor Grossberg proposed that as an alternative to
the current three tests that:
[C]ourts should reformulate the binding commitment, interdependence, and end result tests as two objective tests: (1) an
objective test for arms-length transactions based on the law of
offer and acceptance (hereinafter, “objective test”); and (2) an
economic reality test for transactions between related parties.
For arms-length transactions, the objective test asks whether
the parties’ actions, as demonstrated by documentary evidence
or other admissible evidence regarding contractual obligations,
manifest a mutual intention that a series of transactions should
be combined into a single transaction. As with the objective test
from contract law, when applying this proposed objective test,
the trier of fact looks to the ordinary meaning of terms in documents and the understanding of actions that a reasonable


See Rosenberg, supra note 256, at 407.
497 See Grossberg, supra note 194, at 414 (footnote omitted).
498 Id. (footnote omitted).
496
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person in the position of the other party would have. For related-party transactions, the economic reality test draws upon
the articulation of the interdependence test in True v. United
States and asks whether each step has a “reasoned economic
justification standing alone.”499

Certainly, increased objectivity in determining when steps
should be collapsed would, as Grossberg indicated, serve to “promote ... predictability and certainty .... Taxpayers do not need to be
concerned about a judge or jury construing their intentions—
something that taxpayers have to worry about under the end
result test or even the interdependence test.”500 In short it “promotes the predictable administration of the tax law.”501
Grossberg indicated that with related parties there is a
need for a different test because they “can rely on unwritten
understandings ... [and] there may be no previous course of performance, dealing, or trade to look to in order to understand which
transactions typically have followed one another.”502 In related
party circumstances, he envisioned that the economic reality test
he proposed “would determine reasoned economic justification by
looking to the behavior exhibited by businesses engaged in similar arms-length transactions.”503 Thus, “[i]f businesses engaged
in arms-length transactions would never engage in the intermediate, challenged steps, the steps probably do not have reasoned
economic justification.”504
Although he ultimately advocated replacing all three tests,505
Professor Rosenberg opined that with respect to the mutual interdependence test, while “[i]t will not do for all the cases,”506
the application of the “test to nonrecognition exchanges is fairly
straightforward.”507 He reasoned that:
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Most exchanges, and almost all nonrecognition transactions,
generate no tax savings. A nonrecognition exchange merely
results in no current taxation of accrued appreciation in the
exchanged assets, a result identical to that imposed upon simple
retention of the asset. As a result, the tax savings generated
by a single nonrecognition transaction could never entirely motivate that transaction. The taxpayer must either have some
business purpose (i.e., the desire to exchange assets), some
other tax goal which will be accomplished by the nonrecognition exchange, or some tax purpose which can be accomplished
only by combining the first nonrecognition exchange with a second exchange. In the last case, the two (or more) exchanges
necessary to achieve the single tax purpose will be integrated
and treated as a single transaction.508

Perhaps it is not quite so clear cut. Returning to the dentist/taxpayer with the amalgam patent in Weikel where the Tax
Court chose not to collapse steps upon his contributing the amalgam
business, including the patent, to a newly incorporated entity.509
There was no binding agreement and there was evidence that he
would have contributed the business to a Newco even without a
likely forthcoming transaction with J&J, so the decision was both
conceptually sound and somewhat relatively easy to predict.510
Nevertheless, a sophisticated taxpayer, J&J, thought, or at least
took a tax return position, that this was not the outcome.511 Furthermore, how would the case be decided if there was still no
binding agreement with J&J at the time of the contribution, but
there is no evidence taxpayer would have taken this step, but for
an imminent tax-free acquisition of a Newco with J&J? Is it enough,
as Bowen seemed to suggest, that the shareholder had “all the
attendant benefits and burdens of ownership” and that the patent now in corporate solution could not have been distributed back
to the dentist without incurring tax to Newco?512 What if there
was evidence of an economic compulsion at the time of the contribution to transfer some, or all, of those shares? Presumably,
this might, very well, change the result to not collapse steps.513
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Whatever modifications are adopted to provide more uniformity of the utilization of the step transaction doctrine with
respect to section 351 control, there will undoubtedly still leave
some uncertainty. Bowen, as well as Grossberg and others, have
proposed some interesting and useful ideas.514 This includes eliminating or curtailing the use of the end result test and its focus on
what the parties hoped or intended to achieve.515 The mutual
interdependence test generally incorporating economic justification is another idea worth considering.516
In sum, there are proposed methodologies to the utilization of the step transaction doctrine in this context that if uniformly
applied by the Service and the courts, can ameliorate many, but
not all, of the contradictions identified by Professor Jensen, without
the abolition of an important tool necessary to ensure the statute operates in a proper manner.517 This leads to this Article’s
final point.
Professor Jensen was dismissive of courts that find control was not satisfied in cases where the transferor’s disposition
of shares was connected to the initial contribution and its ownership reflected “fleeting, ephemeral control.”518 He rejected use
of the step transaction doctrine in such circumstances because
there was “no discernable policy exists for limiting nonrecognition.”519 He ignored the fact that only including shares for control purposes where the shareholder has the benefits and burdens
of ownership and maintains freedom of action of the shares is, in
and of itself a sound policy objective.520
CONCLUSION
There should be reasonable, transparent and intellectually
consistent boundaries as to when the step transaction doctrine
should apply for purposes of determining control in a section 351
transaction.521 Professor Jensen provided a superb analysis clearly
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identifying the contradictions by the Service and the courts with
the decision as to when to utilize the canon for determining if
control was met under section 351.522 His proposed solution, that
of complete nullification of the doctrine in determining section
351 control, however, is unwarranted and not sound policy.523
There are legitimate concerns about according nonrecognition in
certain circumstances where ownership is transitory and/or where
the original transfer would not have occurred but for an interdependent disposition of sufficient shares to bring the transferor or
transferors under the eighty percent threshold.524 In many of these
situations, in substance statutory form has not been satisfied.525
The step transaction doctrine should remain an important device
by the courts, the Service, and in some cases by taxpayers, but
tests for utilization should be revised to reduce inconsistency.526
Satisfying statutory form should have been central to Complex Media.527 There were compelling issues raised by the Tax
Court on the ONI merger casting doubt on whether the form in
this case satisfied section 351.528 A step should still not count for
meeting the section 351 control requirement where the form chosen
by the taxpayer does not comport with the statutory requirements.
The Service should have allowed the court to render a judgment
as to whether the form here sufficed.
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